Indiana Law Journal
Volume 97

Issue 1

Article 1

Winter 2022

Lexipol's Fight Against Police Reform
Ingrid V. Eagly
University of California, Los Angeles, eagly@law.ucla.edu

Joanna C. Schwartz
University of California - Los Angeles, schwartz@law.ucla.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Law and Politics Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Law Enforcement and
Corrections Commons

Recommended Citation
Eagly, Ingrid V. and Schwartz, Joanna C. (2022) "Lexipol's Fight Against Police Reform," Indiana Law
Journal: Vol. 97 : Iss. 1 , Article 1.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol97/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Maurer Law Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Lexipol’s Fight Against Police Reform
INGRID V. EAGLY AND JOANNA C. SCHWARTZ*
We are in the midst of a critically important moment in police reform. National
and local attention is fixed on how to reduce the number of people killed and injured
by the police. One approach—which has been recognized for decades to reduce
police killings—is to limit police power to use force.
This Article is the first to uncover how an often-overlooked private company,
Lexipol LLC, has become one of the most powerful voices pushing against reform of
use-of-force standards. Founded in 2003, Lexipol now writes police policies and
trainings for over one-fifth of American law enforcement agencies. As this Article
documents, Lexipol has refused to incorporate common reform proposals into the
policies it writes for its subscribers, including a use-of-force matrix, policies
requiring de-escalation, or bright-line rules prohibiting chokeholds and shooting
into cars. Lexipol has also taken an active advocacy role in opposition to proposed
reforms of police use-of-force standards, pushing, instead, for departments to hew
closely to Graham v. Connor’s “objectively reasonable” standard. Finally, when
use-of-force reforms have been enacted, Lexipol has attempted to minimize their
impact.
Local governments, police departments, and insurers have long viewed Lexipol
as a critically important partner in keeping policies lawful and up to date. This
Article makes clear that they should take a closer look. Lexipol’s aggressive efforts
to retain wide officer discretion to use force may ultimately expose officers and
agencies to liability instead of shielding them from it. It is time for advocacy groups
seeking policing improvements to train their sights on Lexipol. Unless and until
Lexipol changes its approach, the company should be viewed as a barrier to reform.

* Professors of Law, UCLA School of Law. For thoughtful comments on prior drafts,
we thank Barry Friedman, DeRay Mckesson, Ion Moyn, Maria Ponomarenko, Samuel
Sinyangwe, Seth Stoughton, and Samuel Walker. Mónica Reyes-Santiago, Cameron Steger,
Adam Swank, and Bryanna Walker provided superb research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
George Floyd’s tragic murder by former Minneapolis Police officer Derek
Chauvin sparked nationwide protest and renewed debate about the future of police
violence and reform. Advocates, courts, legislators, and public figures from across
the country, all over the world, and every political stripe began calling for wide
ranging changes to police practices. Although many different proposals have been
advanced, one common theme—echoed in many organizations’ platforms and in
bills proposed in the House and Senate—is the need to reform police departments’
use-of-force policies.1

1. For discussion of calls for use-of-force policy reform, see infra Part I.B.
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Today, there are almost 18,000 law enforcement agencies across the country,2 yet
no national standard governing their use of force.3 The only national legal guidance
about what police use-of-force policies should contain comes from the U.S. Supreme
Court’s seminal 1989 decision, Graham v. Connor, which interpreted the Fourth
Amendment to require that officers’ force be “objectively reasonable” under the
totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time.4 Graham has been
widely criticized for not offering sufficient guidance to officers and creating no clear
limits on the extent of officers’ power.5
Proposed reforms to police use-of-force policies coalesce around several basic
principles that move beyond the Graham standard.6 As we develop in Part I of this
Article, at the most basic level, reformers argue that police policies must be more
stringent than Graham, authorizing force only if necessary and prohibiting certain
types of potentially lethal force such as chokeholds and shooting into cars. Those
seeking to reduce police violence also agree that police policies should require that
officers make efforts to de-escalate situations that could result in force and adopt a
continuum that instructs officers to use the least force possible under the
circumstances. To promote accountability for police violence, reformers also favor
comprehensive reporting requirements, including mandated reporting when use of
force does not result in physical injury. Finally, commentators have stressed the
importance of training officers to serve as guardians instead of warriors—focused
not on the use of force against citizens but on protecting them from harm. Decades
of research have demonstrated that more restrictive use-of-force policies and
associated trainings can reduce police violence.7

2. For information about the number of law enforcement agencies across the country,
see FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SUMMARY OF THE UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTING
(UCR)
PROGRAM,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-theu.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/about-ucr/aboutucrmain_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/97MYDGZY].
3. For discussion of the lack of national standards for use of force, see infra Part I.A.
4. 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
5. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some
of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1505 (2016) (explaining that the Graham framework and
other caselaw amounts to a “Privileges and Immunities Clause for police officers”); Rachel
Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1119 (2008) (arguing
that Supreme Court decisions “regulating the use of force by police officers is deeply
impoverished”); Seth W. Stoughton, How the Fourth Amendment Frustrates the Regulation
of Police Violence, 70 EMORY L.J. 521, 526 (2021) (explaining that the Graham factors “have
limited analytical value” and “offer[] no guidance on what type of force or how much force
officers can legitimately use in any given situation”); William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem
and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1044 n.93 (1995) (“One searches
in vain for any body of case law that gives [the Graham] standard some content.”).
6. See infra Part I.C (describing these proposed reforms).
7. See infra notes 86–91, 97–101, 107–08, 116–21, 124–27, 136–39 and accompanying
text (describing reductions on uses of force (without threatening officer safety) correlated with
restrictive use-of-force policies, de-escalation policies, use-of-force continuums, policies
prohibiting certain dangerous policies, policies mandating reporting, and “guardian” style—
as opposed to “warrior” style—trainings).
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In the months following George Floyd’s murder, some law enforcement agencies
embraced these proposed reforms.8 Other law enforcement unions and organizations
resisted calls for reform, arguing instead that proposed changes to use-of-force
policies are unnecessary or would be harmful to law enforcement.9
One of the most powerful voices pushing against reform to use-of-force standards
is an entity unfamiliar to many: a private, for-profit corporation called Lexipol LLC
that contracts with law enforcement agencies to write their law enforcement manuals
and training modules.10 Founded in 2003, Lexipol began as a provider of policies for
law enforcement agencies in Southern California. Since then, Lexipol has rapidly
expanded its footprint and now writes police policies and trainings for over 3500 law
enforcement agencies in thirty-five states.11
In a prior article, we offered the first in-depth analysis of Lexipol’s rise to
prominence and power in police policymaking.12 We found that Lexipol offers a
service that many local governments consider valuable—particularly those without
the resources to craft and update police policies on their own. But we also raised
several concerns about the way in which Lexipol crafts and disseminates its policies.
Top among those concerns is the fact that Lexipol appears to view its products
primarily as a means of reducing legal liability.13
Since the dawn of the police professionalism movement, police policies and
training have been understood as a means of limiting officer discretion—not
reducing liability exposure. In theory, these two interests can go hand in hand—
improving officer behavior can lead to less misconduct and, thus, fewer lawsuits and
payouts. But Lexipol’s approach to reducing liability risk can sit in tension with
longstanding efforts to restrain officers’ discretion through police policies. As we
noted in our 2017 article, Lexipol had opposed calls to craft police policies that went
beyond the standard in Graham or place any hard limits on police officers’ power to
use force, arguing that such limits could jeopardize law enforcement’s position in
litigation.14
Now, in this moment of unprecedented attention to police violence and reform,
policies that preserve maximum officer discretion are under fire. And Lexipol is
fighting back. Lexipol has advertised itself to police departments in impartial
terms—as a company that provides “state-specific law enforcement policies that are

8. See infra notes 144–45 and accompanying text (describing local governments’
adoption of use-of-force policy reforms).
9. See infra notes 146–48 and accompanying text (describing resistance to use-of-force
policy reform).
10. For a description of Lexipol’s history, products, and influence, see Ingrid V. Eagly &
Joanna C. Schwartz, Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking, 96 TEX. L. REV. 891
(2018).
11. Press Release, Lexipol, Lexipol and Praetorian Digital Merge, Creating
Comprehensive Content, Training and Policy Platform for Public Safety, (Feb. 8, 2019),
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/02/08/1714214/0/en/Lexipol-andPraetorian-Digital-Merge-Creating-Comprehensive-Content-Training-and-Policy-Platformfor-Public-Safety.html [https://perma.cc/T3XQ-MVJS].
12. See generally Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 10.
13. Id. at 916.
14. Id. at 925–26.
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updated in response to new state and federal laws and court decisions.”15 Lexipol
claims its policies are authored in consultation with a wide range of groups, including
law enforcement and civil rights groups, to produce policies that conform with the
law and best practices.16 Yet, despite its purported neutrality as a provider of police
policies, Lexipol has been actively engaged in efforts to oppose and undermine useof-force policy reforms.
As this Article documents, Lexipol has opposed reforms in several ways. First,
Lexipol has declined to adopt common reform proposals, including a use-of-force
matrix, policies requiring de-escalation, or bright-line rules prohibiting certain types
of behavior—like chokeholds and shooting into cars. Instead, Lexipol has chosen to
hew its policies closely to Graham’s “objectively reasonable” standard.17
Second, our research reveals that Lexipol has taken an active role in opposition to
proposed reforms of police use-of-force standards. Their advocacy extends far
beyond the policies and trainings it provides its subscribers. Indeed, Lexipol has
disseminated its anti-reform message in blogposts, white papers, informational
webinars, and other materials provided to labor unions and political organizations.18
In 2018, Lexipol acquired a law enforcement training and news entity called
PoliceOne—now rebranded as “Police1 by Lexipol”—which includes original
content and news aggregated from other sources.19 The messaging on Police1 is
consistent with Lexipol’s blogposts, webinars, policies, and trainings. In each forum,
Lexipol espouses the view that police officers need maximum discretion to use force
and that reforms advanced by advocates and lawmakers would undermine this need
to maximize police discretion.
Third, our research shows that Lexipol has attempted to minimize the efficacy of
use-of-force reforms when they are enacted. To illustrate this observation, we
analyze Lexipol’s engagement with a law recently passed in California that allows
police to use force only when necessary.20 Lexipol advocated against the bill when it
was being considered, and its leadership claimed that they were instrumental in
efforts to add language to the bill that made it less restrictive. Although California’s
legislature, its Commission on Police Officer Standards and Training, and advocacy
groups have recognized the enacted law as limiting police powers in meaningful

15. Law Enforcement, LEXIPOL, https://www.lexipol.com/industries/law-enforcement/
[https://perma.cc/U5N2-UJZD].
16. See Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 903 (describing Lexipol’s representation that
it seeks input from a range of sources, including civil rights groups like the ACLU).
17. See, e.g., LEXIPOL, Policy 300—Use of Force, in ANAHEIM PD POLICY MANUAL,
https://www.anaheim.net/DocumentCenter/View/29459/APD-Policy-Manual (last updated
Aug. 27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/K72F-8NA3].
18. See infra Part II.B (describing Lexipol’s dissemination of this message).
19. See Press Release, Police1 by Lexipol, PoliceOne and Lexipol Merge, Creating
Comprehensive Content, Training and Policy Platform for Law Enforcement (Feb. 8, 2019),
https://www.policeone.com/police-products/training/online-training/pressreleases/policeone-and-lexipol-merge-creating-comprehensive-content-training-and-policyplatform-for-law-enforcement-d718pPRW26Vqq9ZT/ [https://perma.cc/SKK4-JLS5].
20. See Assemb. 392, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). For further discussion of
state-level reforms to use-of-force policies, see infra Part III.
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ways, Lexipol has advised its members that nothing has changed in California and
that police departments can continue to rely on the Graham v. Connor standard.21
Understanding Lexipol’s opposition to reform is critically important in this
moment. Lexipol’s rejection of most use-of-force policy reforms means that its 3500
subscribers, almost one-fifth of law enforcement agencies across the country, will be
less likely to adopt these reforms. Lexipol’s anti-reform message, which is
communicated on its website, blogs, and promotional arms like Police1, also serves
as ammunition for state and local governments across the country reticent to adopt
more restrictive policies. And Lexipol’s involvement in the implementation of
reforms once adopted threatens to undermine their spirit and impact.
In this transformative moment in American policing, calls to reform should—and
do—go far beyond changes to use-of-force policies and trainings. Activists and
scholars also seek to defund and dismantle the police, to invest public safety dollars
into Black communities, and to address ongoing and systemic racism in the criminal
justice system and society more generally.22 We agree that an ambitious vision to
rethink the institution of policing is necessary and recognize the crucial work of those
who have begun this task.23 Nevertheless, so long as any future public safety system
includes some officials authorized to use force, Lexipol LLC will undoubtedly seek
to play a role in shaping their powers.

21. See infra Part II.C (describing Lexipol’s efforts to minimize the effects of the
California bill, both before and after its passage); see also infra Part III.B (describing Lexipol’s
role in the implementation of an executive order in New York).
22. See, e.g., #DefundThePolice, BLACK LIVES MATTER (May 30, 2020),
https://blacklivesmatter.com/defundthepolice/ [https://perma.cc/WY5A-BM44] (sharing a
petition calling for a national defunding of the police in order to reinvest that money into Black
communities
and
resources
for
them
to
thrive);
#8TOABOLITION,
https://www.8toabolition.com/ [https://perma.cc/7U9Y-PDP2] (discussing that the claims of
the 8 Can’t Wait Campaign of reducing police killings is false and misleading and do not
reflect the needs of criminalized communities); see also Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and
the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054 (2017) (discussing how “legal
estrangement” offers a more nuanced lens through which scholars and policy makers can
understand and respond to current problems of policing); Christy E. Lopez, Opinion, Defund
the Police? Here’s What That Really Means, WASH. POST (June 7, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/07/defund-police-heres-what-that-reallymeans/ [https://perma.cc/9G7D-QSE2] (explaining how defunding the police means shrinking
the scope of police responsibilities and shifting safety measurements to better equipped entities
while investing more in community resources).
23. See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, How Defund and Disband Became the Demands, N.Y.
REV. (June 15, 2020), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/06/15/how-defund-and-disbandbecame-the-demands/ [https://perma.cc/8ZBV-5RYU]; Paul Butler, The System Is Working
the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419 (2016);
Brian Highsmith, On Reimagining State and Local Budgets in an Abolitionist Moment, LAW
& POL. ECON. BLOG (June 15, 2020), https://lpeblog.org/2020/06/15/on-reimagining-stateand-local-budgets-in-an-abolitionist-moment/ [https://perma.cc/P9U5-XS4L]; Mariame
Kaba, Opinion, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floyd-abolish-defund-police.html
[https://perma.cc/H68E-MBP9]; Jocelyn Simonson, Power Over Policing, BOS. REV. (June 8,
2020), http://bostonreview.net/law-justice/jocelyn-simonson-power-over-policing [https://
perma.cc/ESG6-QR39].
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Lexipol’s dominant role in police policymaking should be cause for real concern.
As this Article reveals, Lexipol has taken a retrograde position in its use-of-force
policies, advocated against proposed use-of-force reforms, and endeavored to
undermine reforms that are enacted. Lexipol is not a reliable partner for federal, state,
and local governments, or for community members and other advocates interested in
advancing police reform.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the current
landscape of police use-of-force policies and six types of use-of-force reforms that
have shaped current calls for change. Part II analyzes Lexipol’s resistance to these
calls for reform and their efforts to diminish the impact of these reforms once
enacted, as revealed in their use-of-force policies and trainings, webinars, blog posts,
and other public statements. Finally, Part III considers the implications of our
findings for local governments, police departments, community organizations, and
proponents of reform.
I. POLICE USE-OF-FORCE POLICIES AND CALLS FOR REFORM
Before discussing Lexipol’s efforts to oppose current calls for use-of-force policy
reforms, it is important first to introduce what those calls for reform are and their
history and evolution. For more than half a century, police department policies have
been viewed as a critically important tool to constrain police officers’ discretion.24
The Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment describe the
outer limits of police authority.25 However, experts agree that internal policies and
training are necessary to give law enforcement more guidance than the Supreme
Court’s decisions offer, teach officers how to go about exercising their authority, and
clarify when officers should refrain from acting.26 In the use-of-force context, experts
have argued that this kind of internal police regulation is particularly crucial.27

24. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing
Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 904 (1962) (“[C]riminal law enforcement can often be
improved substantially by the imposition of legal procedures and standards upon the exercise
of discretion.”); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 349, 423 (1974) (arguing that policies should “direct and confine police discretion”);
Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEX. L. REV. 703, 725
(1974) (“My central idea is that police practices should no longer be exempt from the kind of
judicial review that is usual for other administrative agencies.”).
25. See infra Part I.A.
26. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1827, 1858–62 (2015) (describing the realization in the 1950s “that policing was shot
through with discretion” and efforts to constrain discretion through democratically designed
rules and policies); Herman Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving
Police Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1128 (1967) (explaining that police policies give
an officer “more detailed guidance to . . . decide upon the action he ought to take in dealing
with the wide range of situations which he confronts and exercising the broad authority with
which he is invested”); Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58 HOW. L.J. 521, 521–
22 (2015) (explaining that “[l]aw enforcement officials have tremendous discretion to
determine the amount and style of policing that occurs in their jurisdiction,” and that police
policies distribute the benefits and burdens on policing “by making policy”).
27. See, e.g., SETH W. STOUGHTON, JEFFREY J. NOBLE & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT,
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As recently as 1960 most local police and sheriffs did not yet have a policy on use
of force, but today almost all jurisdictions have at least some written policy in place.28
However, departments have not uniformly embraced restrictive use-of-force policies,
despite evidence that these types of policies can save lives.29 Instead, many
departments’ policies hew to the broad constitutional standard articulated in the
Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Connor—a standard that, experts agree,
imposes no meaningful limits on police powers.30
For decades, advocates have pushed for more restrictive use-of-force policies.31
The intensity of those calls increased after national attention was brought to the
killing of several African American men by police, including Michael Brown in
Ferguson, Missouri, and Eric Garner in New York in 2014,32 Freddie Gray in
Baltimore in 2015,33 and Philando Castile in St. Paul, Minnesota, in 2016.34 The
murder of George Floyd by former Minneapolis officer Derek Chauvin in 2020,35
followed by the 2021 killing of Daunte Wright in a Minneapolis suburb further
energized protest and advocacy about police violence.36

EVALUATING POLICE USES OF FORCE 124 (2020) (“The goal of all police agencies is to form
policies and provide training to assist officers in making critical and sometimes life-and-death
decisions in the field—without the opportunity to seek advice, consult a manual, or ask a
supervisor.”); Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L.
REV. 211, 244–90, 291 (2017) (“To the extent that police agencies rely on Supreme Court
rulings to inform use-of-force and tactics training, we view such approaches as ill advised.”);
see also infra notes 54–57.
28. DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, A PATTERN OF VIOLENCE: HOW THE LAW CLASSIFIES CRIMES
AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR JUSTICE 93, 106 (2021).
29. See infra notes 86–91, 97–101, 107–08, 116–21, 124–27, 136–39 and accompanying
text (describing research showing that limitations on officers’ discretion in the use-of-force
context have reduced shootings and other uses of force).
30. For scholarship criticizing the Supreme Court’s use-of-force doctrine on this ground,
see supra note 5.
31. See infra Part I.B.
32. Eric Garner, Michael Brown Cases Spark ‘Legitimate Concerns’ About US
NATIONS
(Dec.
5,
2014),
Policing—UN
Experts,
UNITED
https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/12/485482-eric-garner-michael-brown-cases-sparklegitimate-concerns-about-us-policing-un [https://perma.cc/B2AZ-UHWF].
33. John Woodrow Cox, Lynh Bui & DeNeen L. Brown, Who Was Freddie Gray? How
Did He Die? And What Led to the Mistrial in Baltimore?, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/who-was-freddie-gray-and-how-did-his-death-leadto-a-mistrial-in-baltimore/2015/12/16/b08df7ce-a433-11e5-9c4e-be37f66848bb_story.html
[https://perma.cc/2Z5X-A7J9].
34. Phil Helsel, Shamar Walters & Alastair Jamieson, Philando Castle Shooting in Falcon
Heights, Minnesota, Sparks Protests, NBC NEWS (July 7, 2016, 12:35 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/philando-castile-shooting-falcon-heightsminnesota-sparks-protests-n605051 [https://perma.cc/Z43A-G3WC].
35. Ronald Tyler & Suzanne A. Luban, Police Use of Force, Training, and a Way
Forward After the Death of George Floyd, SLS BLOGS: LEGAL AGGREGATE (June 4, 2020),
https://law.stanford.edu/2020/06/04/police-use-of-force-training-and-a-way-forward-afterthe-death-of-george-floyd/ [https://perma.cc/55E2-HSYP].
36. What to Know About the Death of Daunte Wright, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/daunte-wright-death-minnesota.html
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In this Part, we begin by introducing what has come to be understood as the
constitutional baseline for officers’ power to use force: the Supreme Court’s decision
in Graham v. Connor.37 We then discuss criticisms of the Graham standard and,
finally, describe specific proposals to change police policy to limit police use of
force.
A. The Constitutional Baseline for Police Use of Force
Beyond federal constitutional law, there are currently no national standards
concerning what a use-of-force policy should contain. As a result, the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, which is widely recognized as an
indeterminate framework for police use of force, plays an outsized role in current
police use-of-force policies.
Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the constitutional limits of police
power to use force in multiple opinions, its seminal decision in this area is Graham
v. Connor.38 The case was brought by Dethorne Graham, a Black man with diabetes,
who was beaten and injured by police conducting an investigatory stop while Graham
was having an insulin reaction.39 In its 1989 decision, the Supreme Court clarified
that the Fourth Amendment and its “reasonableness” standard should decide
excessive force claims brought against law enforcement.
In evaluating the reasonableness of police violence, the Court found that the
reasonableness inquiry “is an objective one” and specified that the officers’ actions
must be judged “in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without
regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”40 The Court discussed a number of
different factors to consider when assessing the objective reasonableness of uses of
force, including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”41 The Court also advised
lower courts assessing the constitutionality of officers’ behavior that “police officers
are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation” and instructed them that “‘reasonableness’ . . . must be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight.”42

[https://perma.cc/HGG9-FQ2N].
37. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
38. Id. For discussions of the Supreme Court’s other key decisions concerning excessive
force claims brought under the Fourth Amendment, see Harmon, supra note 5, at 1128–40
(describing Tennessee v. Garner and Scott v. Harris, as well as Graham); Garrett & Stoughton,
supra note 27, at 222–37 (describing Garner and Graham). Because police department useof-force policies are so reliant on the Court’s decision in Graham, it is the focus for our
analysis here.
39. Graham, 490 U.S. at 388.
40. Id. at 397.
41. Id. at 396.
42. Id. at 396–97.
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Commentators have criticized the Graham standard for offering inadequate
guidance to officers about the limits of their power to use force. As Rachel Harmon
has explained, the Supreme Court’s use-of-force jurisprudence is “deeply
problematic.”43 She writes:
It provides unprincipled, indeterminate, and sometimes simply
misleading guidance to lower courts, police officers, jurors, and
members of the public because it fails to articulate a systematic
conceptual framework for assessing police uses of force. . . . [I]t does not
answer adequately the most basic questions about police uses of force:
when a police officer may use force against a citizen, how much force he
may use, and what kinds of force are permissible.44
Brandon Garrett and Seth Stoughton echo these concerns, explaining that the
Supreme Court’s “totality of the circumstances” approach to the constitutionality of
police uses of force in Graham is “not only poorly suited for police training, but
actually counterproductive, confounding efforts to draft clear use-of-force policies”
and “providing little meaningful guidance to police officers.”45
Because there are no national standards for use of force, there is significant
variation across police department use-of-force policies.46 Yet, even with this
variation, a common theme in use-of-force policies is that they tend to hew closely
to Graham. In 2016, Garrett and Stoughton reviewed use-of-force policies in the fifty
largest policing agencies across the country. They observed wide variation, but also
found the “[t]he Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine exerts real pull
on . . . police policies” with “[a]bout half” of the policies they reviewed “rel[ying]
on language from Graham and the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment cases.”47
Similarly, in 2017, Osagie Obasogie and Zachary Newman conducted a qualitative
content analysis of use-of-force policies in the twenty largest U.S. cities.48 They
found that many policies did not restrict police activity or offer guidance for use of
force beyond the minimum standard of Graham. The authors concluded that such
policies failed to “delimit police power in a meaningful way and [also failed to]

43. Harmon, supra note 5, at 1127.
44. Id. (emphasis omitted).
45. Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 27, at 217–18.
46. See, e.g., id. at 280 (finding that “even the largest agencies, which one might expect
to be the most sophisticated and attentive to best practices, have widely varying force policies,
many of which are quite minimalistic”); WILLIAM TERRILL, EUGENE A. PAOLINE III & JASON
INGRAM, FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT DRAFT: ASSESSING POLICE USE OF FORCE POLICY AND
OUTCOMES
iii–iv
(2011),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/237794.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N53Z-NGHC] (finding a wide range of policies in a random study of 1000
policing agencies, and concluding that “it was difficult to identify a standard practice that is
used by police departments across the country,” observing that agencies “pick and choose, and
tweak and adapt, in a multitude of ways—all, unfortunately, with no empirical evidence as to
which approach is best or even better than any other”).
47. Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 27, at 285.
48. Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, Police Violence, Use of Force Policies, and
Public Health, 43 AM. J.L. & MED. 279 (2017).
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promote public health.”49 Despite the lack of guidance in Graham, the decision plays
an outsized role in police department policies.
B. The Movement to Limit Police Power to Use Force
There have long been calls by government officials and advocates to reform police
policies in ways that restrict police power to use force. These calls for reform began
in the mid-1960s, when police shootings and violence prompted protests across the
United States, including in Watts, Harlem, Detroit, and Newark.50 Although some
understood the police as an institution designed to reduce street crime, critics
increasingly pointed out the role of the police as an institution of racial oppression
and control.51 At the time, officers had few limits on their power to use deadly force.52
In the wake of public outcry, President Lyndon B. Johnson established a National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. The Commission’s final report concluded
that “[w]hite racism is essentially responsible for the explosive mixture which has
been accumulating in our cities.”53 The report recommended that police develop clear
guidelines on when to use force, including nonlethal force.54 Just one year earlier,
the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice led
by Harvard Law Professor James Vorenberg published a report recommending that
police departments “develop and enunciate policies that give police personnel
specific guidance for common situations requiring exercise of police discretion.”55
According to the Vorenberg Commission, use of force was a key area where policy
development was needed: it warned that “too much force” should not be used in the
context of public demonstrations and that “comprehensive regulation” should limit
the use of firearms to situations of imminent and serious danger.56 Scholars during
this period also joined in the growing call to reduce and constrain police use of
violence.57 Law enforcement agencies across the country, heeding these calls, began

49. Id. at 287.
50. See James J. Fyfe, Police Use of Deadly Force: Research and Reform, 5 JUST. Q. 165,
166 (1988). For a masterful exploration of these and other events, and their characterization
as rebellions, see ELIZABETH HINTON, AMERICA ON FIRE (2021).
51. James Q. Wilson, What Makes a Better Policeman, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 1969, at
129.
52. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 26, at 1858–62 (describing the lack of
constraints on officers’ power to use force during this period).
53. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 91 (1967).
54. Id. at 176–77.
55. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON L. ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUST., THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN
A FREE SOCIETY 104 (1967).
56. Id. at 118–19; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE
FUNCTION (1973) (recognizing the importance of police rulemaking on enforcement methods).
57. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 24 (arguing in favor of police policies that eliminate
“unnecessary police discretion” and confine, structure, and check necessary police discretion);
James J. Fyfe, Observations on Police Deadly Force, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 376, 388 (1981)
(recommending that police departments “institute clear policy guidelines to limit the use of
deadly force”); Lawrence W. Sherman, Execution Without Trial: Police Homicide and the
Constitution, 33 VAND. L. REV. 71 (1980); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975)
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developing use-of-force policies and tactics and employing less-lethal force,
including tasers and pepper spray.58
The beating of Rodney King in 1991 prompted congressional interest in structural
police reform and led Congress to authorize the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to
investigate and sue police departments for systemic constitutional violations.59 Useof-force policies were an early focus of these DOJ investigations,60 and restrictions
on use of force became a signature component of DOJ consent decrees.61 Improved
use-of-force policies were one of the cornerstones of a package of reforms promoted
by the DOJ to improve the integrity of policing.62
Following the 2014 killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and several
other high-profile killings of African American men during that same period,
politicians, police organizations, academics, and activists renewed calls to restrict
police power to use force. A commission established by the governor of Missouri
issued a report concluding that racial inequity continued to be an ongoing root cause
of the problems and that policies and trainings should be revised to “authorize only
the minimal amount of force necessary.”63 Furthermore, the Ferguson Commission
warned, “[w]hen citizens are treated with more force than their actions merit, then
their rights have been violated.”64 During this same period, President Obama formed
a Commission on 21st Century Policing.65 Obama’s Commission found that “clear

(studying selective enforcement of the criminal law in Chicago and setting out a framework
for checking police discretion); GREGORY HOWARD WILLIAMS, THE LAW AND POLITICS OF
POLICE DISCRETION (1984) (studying how to address problems presented by expansive police
discretion); see also Jerry V. Wilson, Deadly Force, POLICE CHIEF, Dec. 1972, at 44.
58. For discussion of the development of police tactics, see Garrett & Stoughton, supra
note 27, at 244–49. For some examples of the development of police department guidance
regarding the use of force, see STOUGHTON, NOBLE & ALPERT, supra note 27, at 107–09
(describing the development of early use of force continua by the Los Angeles Police
Department).
59. See Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
3189, 3207–15 (2014) (tracing the passage of Section 14141 in 1994, which authorizes DOJ
investigations of police departments).
60. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 34 U.S.C. § 12601
(formerly 42 U.S.C. § 14141) (authorizing the Attorney General to conduct investigations and
file civil litigation to eliminate a “pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement
officers . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by
the Constitution or laws of the United States”).
61. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY 3 (2001),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/ojp/186189.pdf [https://perma.cc/96LF-P8D2]. For further
discussion of DOJ litigation against local police departments for unconstitutional use of force,
see Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement”
Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793 (2016).
62. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 61.
63. THE FERGUSON COMM’N, FORWARD THROUGH FERGUSON: A PATH TOWARD RACIAL
EQUITY 26, 158 (2015), https://3680or2khmk3bzkp33juiea1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/101415_FergusonCommissionReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8B358Y7X].
64. Id. at 26.
65. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S
TASK
FORCE
ON
21ST
CENTURY
POLICING
5
(2015),

362013-ILJ 97-1_Text.indd 24

1/24/22 9:03 AM

2022]

LEXIPOL’S FIGHT AGAINST POLICE REFORM

13

and comprehensive policies on the use of force (including training on the importance
of de-escalation)” were essential and that such policies should adopt a “‘sanctity of
life’ philosophy.”66 The DOJ also investigated the Ferguson Police Department and
concluded it should revise its policies to require the least amount of force necessary,
increase training on use of force, and reorient toward de-escalation.67
At around the same time, two influential law enforcement groups issued reports
recommending baseline standards for police use-of-force policies. In 2016, the Police
Executive Research Forum (PERF), a police research and policy organization,
published thirty recommended changes for use-of-force policies.68 These
recommendations, which were the product of eighteen months of research,
fieldwork, and discussion, emphasized the importance of developing best policies,
practices, and training on use-of-force issues.69 In 2017, the International Association
of Chiefs of Police (IACP), a membership-based nonprofit organization of influential
police leaders, published what they described as a National Consensus Policy on use
of force.70 The goal of the project was to create a set of national guidelines on use of
force to help police evaluate their own policies.71
Following the killing of George Floyd in May 2020, advocacy groups and
legislators focused with renewed intensity on police use-of-force policies as a
primary target for reform. The Justice in Policing Act, passed in the House of
Representatives in 2020 and again in 2021, would have eliminated federal funding

https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LU8B246K].
66. Id. at 2, 19.
67. C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 92–93 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/
attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HM2ACB8L].
68. POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 33–71 (2016),
https://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4SDW-B9D3] [hereinafter GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE]; About
EXEC.
RSCH.
F.,
https://www.policeforum.org/about-us
PERF,
POLICE
[https://perma.cc/V7UR-X4SG]. See generally Samuel Walker, “Not Dead Yet”: The
National Police Crisis, a New Conversation About Policing, and the Prospects for
Accountability-Related Police Reform, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1777 (2018) (examining the
positions of PERF, the President’s Task Force, the Department of Justice, and other influential
groups in recent efforts to reform police policymaking).
69. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE, supra note 68, at 33–49.
70. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, NATIONAL CONSENSUS POLICY AND DISCUSSION
PAPER ON USE OF FORCE (2017), https://www.theiacp.org/resources/document/nationalconsensus-discussion-paper-on-use-of-force-and-consensus-policy [https://perma.cc/ZYA9RZ3T] (follow “Download PDF” hyperlink).
71. Id. at 2. The IACP’s report is considered to be a response to the PERF report and
recommends use-of-force policies that are less restrictive than those recommended in the
PERF report. For further discussion of the differences between the reports, see Samuel Walker,
“Consensus” Use of Force Policy by 11 Police Groups Takes Two Steps Backwards, Two
WALKER
C.L.,
POLICING
&
CRIM.
JUST.,
Steps
Forward,
SAMUEL
https://samuelwalker.net/2017/01/consensus-use-force-policy-11-police-groups-takes-twosteps-backwards-two-steps-forward [https://perma.cc/ZY9D-WJTG].
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for jurisdictions that did not prohibit the use of chokeholds.72 Reporters for the
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Policing, a group of legal experts
that drafts general principles to govern policing, proposed creating a national use-offorce standard that would make clear, among other things, “that lethal force should
be a last resort.”73 National advocacy groups, including the Advancement Project,
Color of Change, Communities United Against Police Brutality, the Leadership
Conference on Civil and Human Rights, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and the
National Association Against Police Brutality, pressed for use-of-force policies more
restrictive than Graham and bright-line rules prohibiting chokeholds and shooting
into cars, among other reforms.74 Even some law enforcement organizations,
including the Law Enforcement Action Partnership and some California police
unions, called for use-of-force reform following the killing of George Floyd.75

72. George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. § 363 (2020);
George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. § 363 (2021).
73. BARRY FRIEDMAN, BRANDON L. GARRETT, RACHEL HARMON, CHRISTY E. LOPEZ,
TRACEY L. MEARES, MARIA PONOMARENKO, CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & TOM R. TYLER,
CHANGING THE LAW TO CHANGE POLICING: FIRST STEPS
2 (2020),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/justice/document/change_to_change_final.
pdf [https://perma.cc/VP2N-3UHK].
74. See, e.g., The Change We Need: 5 Issues that Should Be Part of Efforts to Reform
Policing in Local Communities, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, https://advancementproject.org/thechange-we-need-5-issues-that-should-be-part-of-efforts-to-reform-policing-in-localcommunities/ [https://perma.cc/MX22-ANXU] (recommending policies to “prohibit acts such
as neck holds, head strikes with a hard object, and using force against persons in handcuffs”);
LDF Releases Policing Reform Demands to Federal Elected Officials, Governors, Mayors,
and Police Chiefs, LEGAL DEF. FUND (June 5, 2020), https://www.naacpldf.org/pressrelease/ldf-releases-policing-reform-demands-to-federal-elected-officials-governors-mayorsand-police-chiefs [https://perma.cc/G69S-T62C] (demanding that the federal government
adopt a standard that “requires the use of force to be used only when necessary as a last resort”
and “[p]rohibit all police neck hold maneuvers, including chokeholds and carotid control
holds”); Letter from Leadership Conf. on Civ. and Hum. Rts. to House and Senate Leadership
(June 1, 2020), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/policy/letters/2020/Coalition_Letter_to_House_
and_Senate_Leadership_on_Federal_Policing_Priorites_Final_6.1.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/
X6S3-ZBHX] (demanding “mandatory de-escalation training for all officers” and urging
Congress to pass legislation prohibiting chokeholds); CMTYS. UNITED AGAINST POLICE
BRUTALITY, WHAT WILL IT TAKE TO END POLICE VIOLENCE?: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REFORM,
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cuapb/pages/1/attachments/original/
1591595256/WHAT_WILL_IT_TAKE_TO_END_POLICE_VIOLENCE_with_Appendices
.pdf?1591595256 [https://perma.cc/YD5K-WSR7] (calling for a restriction of the use of
deadly force except as a last resort, and for a ban on chokeholds and other lethal restraint
methods); Moving to Action Dismantling Institutional Racism & Ending Police Misconduct:
20 Policy Demands, NAT’L ASS’N AGAINST POLICE BRUTALITY, https://www.naapb.org/
[https://perma.cc/R3M6-X7A6] (calling for mandatory de-escalation and standardized use-offorce policies).
75. See, e.g., National Policing Recommendations, L. ENF’T ACTION P’SHIP (June 3,
2020),
https://lawenforcementactionpartnership.org/national-policing-recommendations
[https://perma.cc/9JCM-4SLY] (recommending that police use-of-force policies go beyond
the Graham threshold and require de-escalation and intervention, and prohibit maneuvers that
restrict blood flow to the brain without legal force justification); L.A. POLICE PROTECTIVE

362013-ILJ 97-1_Text.indd 26

1/24/22 9:03 AM

2022]

LEXIPOL’S FIGHT AGAINST POLICE REFORM

15

Perhaps the most influential group taking part in the recent debate over use-offorce policies is Campaign Zero, a policy-driven, data-driven platform created in
2015 with the goal of reducing police violence.76 The organization consulted with
experts to identify a package of eight recommended policies, popularly referred to as
“8 Can’t Wait.”77 Campaign Zero has also offered evidence that these eight policies
can save lives: Based on an analysis of use-of-force policies in 100 of the largest
jurisdictions across the country, it found that departments with more of these eight
recommended policies had fewer police killings than jurisdictions with fewer,
measured per capita and by numbers of arrests.78 Campaign Zero also found that
officers were less frequently assaulted and killed in jurisdictions with more
restrictive use-of-force policies.79
C. Specific Proposals for Reform
Although the exact recommendations for reform of use-of-force policies have
varied, generally speaking they fall into six categories. This subsection summarizes
each type of reform, provides examples of states or localities that have adopted such
a change, and describes available evidence of the impact of these policies.80 We will
return to these six types of reform in Part II when we describe Lexipol’s resistance
to them.

LEAGUE, S.F. OFFICERS ASS’N & SAN JOSÉ POLICE OFFICERS’ ASS’N,
https://mcusercontent.com/6a0707887484bfcead01dcf9d/files/2d22b0f5-f07e-4f24-b2e3340157b97944/BAN0006491356_01_hr_1_.pdf [https://perma.cc/QAF2-LMZ9] (publishing
a full-page newspaper advertisement to call for “[a] national use-of-force standard that
emphasizes a reverence for life, de-escalation, a duty to intercede, proportional responses to
dangerous incidents and strong accountability”).
76. CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://www.joincampaignzero.org [https://perma.cc/XCA2L3AQ].
77. See generally Campaign Zero, #8CantWait, #8CANTWAIT, https://8cantwait.org/
[https://perma.cc/Z4J9-2CKA].
78. Samuel Sinyangwe, Examining the Role of Use of Force Policies in Ending Police
Violence (Sept. 20, 2016) (unpublished draft), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2841872 [https://perma.cc/YG48-4N7C]. The data supporting these
reductions in killings have been questioned. See, e.g., Cherrell Brown & Philip V. McHarris,
#8cantwait Is Based on Faulty Data Science, MEDIUM (June 5, 2020),
https://medium.com/@8cantwait.faulty/8cantwait-is-based-on-faulty-data-sciencea4e0b85fae40 [https://perma.cc/58UZ-3M4G]. For a thoughtful response and
contextualization of Campaign Zero’s findings by the author of the study, see Samuel
Sinyangwe (@samswey), TWITTER (June 6, 2020), https://twitter.com/samswey/status/
1269298269055856641?s=20 [https://perma.cc/X5N5-WNG6].
79. Sinyangwe, supra note 78, at 4.
80. Although we favor more restrictive use-of-force policies, we do not take a position
here about whether this collection of policy reforms is optimal, which reforms are most
important, or precisely how changes to policy language should be crafted. Our goal, instead,
is to describe in general terms the types of use-of-force policy reforms that advocates have
advanced in recent years and to summarize existing evidence that these policies can have a
positive impact.
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1. Replace Graham
First, there is a widely held view that the Supreme Court’s constitutional standards
provide inadequate guidance for officers about their power to use force.81 As a result,
the Police Executive Research Forum, Law Enforcement Action Partnership,
Campaign Zero, Communities United Against Police Brutality, and the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund have each recommended policies more restrictive than
Graham.82
Several states have passed legislation restricting officers’ uses of force to
situations when it is “necessary.”83 Although the language of these statutes differ,
their goal appears to be the same: to replace the Graham standard, which allows
police to use force when it is objectively reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances, with laws that allow force only when “necessary” or “as a last
resort.”84 Seattle and San Francisco’s police departments have adopted similarly
restrictive standards.85

81. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text (describing this criticism of Graham).
82. See supra notes 70, 74–76.
83. See, e.g., Assemb. 392, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (allowing deadly force
“when the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of the circumstances, that deadly
force is necessary to defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury”); S.
20-217, 72nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020) (allowing “deadly physical force to make
an arrest only when all other means of apprehension are unreasonable given the
circumstances”); H.R. 6462, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2021) (allowing deadly
physical force only when the officer “has reasonably determined that there are no available
reasonable alternatives”); S. 71, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021) (allowing force only when
“under the totality of the circumstances, the force is necessary and proportional”); H.R. 1, 91st
Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Minn. 2020) (allowing deadly force only “if an objectively reasonable
officer would believe, based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the
time and without the benefit of hindsight, that such force is necessary”); H.R. 145, 2020-2021
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2021) (allowing deadly force “only when, based on the totality of the
circumstances, such force is objectively reasonable and necessary”); H.R. 1310, 67th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021) (allowing force only when “necessary to . . . protect against an
imminent threat of bodily injury to the peace officer, another person, or the person against
whom force is being used”).
84. See supra note 83. For one possible definition of what constitutes “necessary” force,
see POLICING PROJECT, NYU SCH. L., COMPREHENSIVE USE OF FORCE STATUTE
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58a33e881b631bc60d4f8b31/t/605e079e43da3703cf02
65d2/1616775070741/Comprehensive+Use+of+Force+Statute_3.24.21+for+website.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A3DE-A96Y] (defining physical force as necessary “when there are no
reasonable alternative means to effect the lawful objective and avoid the use of force, including
non-force tactics or techniques that are intended to stabilize the situation and reduce the
immediacy of the threat, such as distance, cover, containment, tactical repositioning,
requesting additional officers, and surveillance; verbal communication or de-escalation; and
the deployment of specialized equipment or resources, such as officers trained in crisis
intervention, or mental health professionals. An alternative to the use of physical force may
be a reasonable alternative even if it extends the overall duration of the interaction.”).
85. California Set to Pass Landmark Legislation to Save Lives, Reduce the Number of
Police Shootings, ACLU S. CAL. (July 8, 2019), https://www.aclusocal.org/en/pressreleases/california-set-pass-landmark-legislation-save-lives-reduce-number-police-shootings
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There is evidence suggesting that this type of restrictive use-of-force standard can
save lives. After adopting such a standard, Seattle reported a “significant reduction”
in the number of force incidents without a decrease in officer or civilian safety.86 San
Francisco also reported a decline in force incidents, including fewer police
shootings.87 Evidence from Seattle and San Francisco is consistent with studies
showing that more restrictive use-of-force policies, while hardly a cure-all, are
associated with a reduction in police killings and other violence.88 Large police
departments, including New York City, Oakland, and Philadelphia, implemented
more restrictive use-of-force policies in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and studies
found that these more restrictive policies significantly reduced injuries and killings
by police.89 Similar studies in Atlanta, Georgia, and Kansas City, Missouri, in the
1980s found police shootings decreased after implementation of more restrictive
deadly force guidelines.90 Another study found a sixteen percent reduction
nationwide in fatal police shootings after the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in
Tennessee v. Garner, which held it unconstitutional to shoot a person fleeing arrest
who was not a threat to the officers or others.91
These studies—and those we reference throughout the remainder of this
Subpart—do not definitively show that enacting restrictive use-of-force policies will
necessarily reduce police uses of force and killings. Even if more restrictive policies

[https://perma.cc/44YE-4VMM] (describing use-of-force policies in Seattle and San
Francisco).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. GELLER & MICHAEL S. SCOTT, DEADLY FORCE: WHAT WE
KNOW: A PRACTITIONER’S DESK REFERENCE ON POLICE-INVOLVED SHOOTINGS (1992)
(analyzing data on the prevalence of police-involved shootings and strategies for reducing
these incidents); James J. Fyfe, Administrative Interventions on Police Shooting Discretion:
An Empirical Examination, 7 J. CRIM. JUST. 309 (1979) (examining the effects of more
restrictive guidelines on shooting frequencies, patterns, and consequences in New York in
1972); Jay T. Jennings & Meghan E. Rubado, Preventing the Use of Deadly Force: The
Relationship Between Police Agency Policies and Rates of Officer-Involved Gun Deaths, 77
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 217 (2017) (finding that police agencies that require officers to file a report
when they point their guns have significantly lower rates of fatal shootings by officers); Albert
J. Reiss, Jr., Controlling Police Use of Deadly Force, 452 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 122 (1980) (establishing the importance of controlling the use of deadly force by the
police by restricting opportunities for the legitimate use of force); Gerald F. Uelmen, Varieties
of Police Policy: A Study of Police Policy Regarding the Use of Deadly Force in Los Angeles
County, 6 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 48 (1973) (finding “a strong correlation between the
restrictiveness of policy and the number of shooting incidents reported” in a study of police
policies and uses of force in law enforcement agencies in Los Angeles County).
89. Michael D. White, Assessing the Impact of Administrative Policy on Use of Deadly
Force by On- and Off-Duty Police, 24 EVAL. REV. 295, 296 (2000).
90. Stephen A. Bishopp, David A. Klinger & Robert G. Morris, An Examination of the
Effect of a Policy Change on Police Use of TASERs, 26 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 727, 729–30
(2015); see also Mark Blumberg, Controlling Police Use of Deadly Force: Assessing Two
Decades of Progress, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING 442 (Roger G. Dunham & Geoffrey P.
Alpert eds., 1989).
91. Abraham N. Tennenbaum, The Influence of the Garner Decision on Police Use of
Deadly Force, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 241, 241 (1994).
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are enacted, they may not make much of a difference if officers are not trained in
these new policies, supervisors do not communicate the importance of these policies
to their subordinates, or there are no disciplinary consequences for officers who fail
to follow them. Moreover, there are other factors, beyond use-of-force policies, that
may influence the frequency with which officers use force, including social and
political forces within the police department and community they serve. Yet the
research that has been conducted over the past several decades does consistently
suggest that more restrictive use-of-force policies are correlated with reduced police
killings, but not with increases in crime, harm to officers, or other types of negative
effects.
2. De-Escalation
Another key recommendation for reform of use-of-force policies is to adopt deescalation policies and training. De-escalation teaches that taking steps to defuse a
situation can prevent it from reaching a point where there is a risk of death or harm
to anyone, including to law enforcement officers.92 De-escalation has been defined
by the IACP’s National Consensus Policy as:
Taking action or communicating verbally or non-verbally during a
potential force encounter in an attempt to stabilize the situation and
reduce the immediacy of the threat so that more time, options, and
resources can be called upon to resolve the situation without the use of
force or with a reduction in the force necessary.93
After Ferguson, de-escalation training was endorsed by the President’s Task Force
on 21st Century Policing.94 One of PERF’s guiding principles on use of force is that
agencies adopt a de-escalation policy,95 and Campaign Zero has made requiring
officers to de-escalate situations one of eight key recommendations for restrictions
in police uses of force.96
Growing calls for police policies that require officers to de-escalate situations are
supported by evidence that de-escalation can in fact reduce police violence. The San
Francisco Police Department found that forty-five percent of police shootings over a

92. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE, supra note 68, at 21.
93. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 70, at 2.
94. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 65, at 20–21.
95. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE, supra note 68, at 40. PERF also published an
earlier report on the importance of de-escalation as part of its critical issues in policing series.
POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO DE-ESCALATION AND MINIMIZING USE
OF
FORCE
(2012),
https://www.calea.org/sites/default/files/PERF%20UOF%20DeEscalation_v5.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB46-2LAF] (explaining that the goal of de-escalation
“is to prevent injuries to everyone—the subject, the public, and police officers”).
96. DERAY MCKESSON, SAMUEL SINYANGWE, JOHNETTA ELZIE & BRITTANY PACKNETT,
CAMPAIGN ZERO, POLICE USE OF FORCE POLICY ANALYSIS 3 (2016),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56996151cbced68b170389f4/t/57e1b5cc2994ca4ac1d9
7700/1474409936835/Police+Use+of+Force+Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XVB3-25LY].
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five-year period occurred within one minute of officers arriving.97 As Assistant Chief
Toney Chaplin explains, the number of shootings “falls off a cliff with each minute
that you stall these things out. If we create this time and distance, . . . we save lives.”98
The Dallas Police Department has also been heralded as a case study in why
emphasizing de-escalation techniques positively affects police conduct.99 One year
after instituting de-escalation training, the department saw an eighteen percent
decrease in use of force.100 Additionally, within four years, excessive force
complaints had dropped by sixty-four percent.101
3. Use-of-Force Continuum
Reformers have consistently advocated that law enforcement adopt use-of-force
continuums to encourage officers only to use an amount of force that is proportional
to the circumstances.102 A use-of-force continuum—also sometimes referred to as a
matrix—is a standard that gives police officers guidelines on how much force is
appropriate for different situations.103 For example, as the National Institute of
Justice has outlined, a use-of-force continuum may indicate that if an officer is
engaging in a verbal exchange, the officer may use nonphysical forms of force, such
as issuing “calm, nonthreatening commands.”104 Campaign Zero’s Police Use of
Force Project includes “develop[ing] a Force Continuum that limits the types of force
and/or weapons that can be used to respond to specific types of resistance” among
the top eight priorities for police use-of-force policy reform.105

97. Curtis Gilbert, Not Trained to Not Kill, APM REPORTS (May 5, 2017),
https://www.apmreports.org/story/2017/05/05/police-de-escalation-training [https://perma.
cc/P2PC-JQJ3].
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., POLICE USE OF FORCE: AN EXAMINATION OF MODERN
POLICING PRACTICES 117 (2018); Rachel Abanonu, De-Escalating Police Encounters, 27 S.
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 239, 249–50 (2018); Drake Baer, The Dallas Police Force Is
(July
8,
2016),
Evidence
that
‘De-escalation’
Policing
Works,
CUT
https://www.thecut.com/2016/07/deescalation-policing-works.html [https://perma.cc/D8NQJ7ST].
100. Gilbert, supra note 97.
101. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 99.
102. See infra notes 103–04 and accompanying text. Note, however, that some
organizations are more ambivalent about rigid use-of-force matrices. The Police Executive
Research Forum, for example, argues that matrices are too rigid and prefers models that
encourage “finding the most effective and safest response that is proportional to the threat.”
GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE, supra note 68, at 20.
103. STOUGHTON, NOBLE & ALPERT, supra note 27, at 106–10 (describing a “continuum”
or “matrix” as “the oldest and most popular” use-of-force guideline adopted by police
departments). Continuums can be contrasted with bright-line rules, discussed infra, which
draw categorical distinctions between violence and nonviolence. See generally SKLANSKY,
supra note 28, at 107 (critiquing use-of-force continuums as lacking a “sharp line dividing
violence from nonviolence”).
104. The Use-of-Force Continuum, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (Aug. 3, 2009),
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/use-force-continuum [https://perma.cc/J2T7-7SB2].
105. Police Use of Force Project, CAMPAIGN ZERO, http://useofforceproject.org/#project
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More than eighty percent of 641 law enforcement agencies surveyed in 2006 and
2007 reported having a use-of-force continuum, although they varied in design and
in the way that they ranked different types of force and resistance.106 Given this
variation, it is particularly difficult to measure the impact of use-of-force continuums
on police behavior. But research does suggest that limiting officers’ discretion to use
force through use-of-force continuums can reduce police violence. For example, a
2008 study of the Orlando Police Department found that overall taser deployments
decreased after the department updated its use-of-force continuum to allow for taser
use only in active resistance situations.107 The study additionally found that, although
officers perceived an increased risk of harm to themselves due to the policy change,
the decrease in taser use actually increased the safety of both officers and civilians.108
4. Bright-Line Rules, Such as Prohibiting Chokeholds and Shooting at Moving
Vehicles
Another set of proposals would prohibit dangerous activities outright rather than
leave them to officer discretion. For example, PERF recommends that “[s]hooting at
vehicles must be prohibited.”109 Campaign Zero’s 8 Can’t Wait agenda includes both
ending chokeholds and neck restraints and also shooting into moving vehicles.110
Other groups, including the Advancement Project, the Leadership Conference on
Civil and Human Rights, and the Law Enforcement Action Partnership, have also
called for bright-line rules to reduce use of force, such as prohibiting “neck holds,
head strikes with a hard object, and using force against persons in handcuffs.”111
In response to the killing of George Floyd, legislators at the federal and state levels
took action to ban chokeholds. The George Floyd Justice in Policing Act, passed by
the U.S. House of Representatives in June of 2020 and again in May of 2021, would
have encouraged chokehold bans and eliminated no-knock warrants in drug cases,
among other provisions.112 In the year following Floyd’s murder, at least seventeen
state legislatures—including California, Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, Nevada,
Oregon, Virginia, and Washington—banned or restricted chokeholds and other neck
restraints.113 Local police departments enacted these types of bans as well. Within

[https://perma.cc/F3EG-WHWN].
106. William Terrill & Eugene A. Paoline, III, Examining Less Lethal Force Policy and
the Force Continuum: Results from a National Use-of-Force Study, 16 POLICE Q. 38, 44–45
(2012).
107. Previously, the Orlando Police Department allowed tasers to be used at a lower,
passive resistance force level. Michael E. Miller, Examining the Effect of Organizational
Policy Change on Taser Utilizations 15, 94, 99 (2008) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Central Florida), http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/CFE0002150 [https://perma.cc/849Y-J54B].
108. Id. at 119. For other research about the impact of more restrictive policies on lesslethal uses of force, see CAL. DEP’T JUST., SACRAMENTO POLICE DEPARTMENT: REPORT &
RECOMMENDATIONS 84–85 (2019), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/pressdocs/spd-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FR4X-2V8U].
109. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE, supra note 68, at 44.
110. Campaign Zero, supra note 77.
111. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 74.
112. See George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. (2021).
113. Farnoush Amiri, Colleen Slevin & Camille Fassett, Floyd Killing Prompts Some
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only a few months of George Floyd’s killing, at least thirty-two of the nation’s sixtyfive largest police departments banned or placed restrictions on the use of neck
restraints by their officers.114 Some police departments have also issued policies
banning or restricting foot pursuits and shooting into cars, although less action has
been taken at the state and federal level to limit these types of dangerous activities.115
Research suggests that when police departments adopt these types of restrictions,
officers reduce their reliance on lethal force. For instance, when the New York Police
Department (NYPD) banned shooting into moving vehicles in 1972, it immediately
saw a “sharp reduction” in the use of lethal force and a thirty-three percent reduction
in shooting incidents after one year.116 Within two years of the policy change, the
number of lethal shootings had dropped by fifty percent.117 Importantly, after the
prohibition was adopted, NYPD officer safety was not adversely impacted: in fact,
injuries and deaths of officers declined significantly after the policy change.118 A
2016 review of the Orlando Police Department’s fatal shootings found that thirty
percent of its shootings for the previous decade involved officers shooting at moving
vehicles.119 One year after implementing restrictions on shooting into moving
vehicles in June 2016, the department had had no fatal shootings involving a moving

States to Limit or Ban Chokeholds, AP NEWS (May 23, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/george-floyd-business-police-reform-death-of-george-floydgovernment-and-politics-d706e72d068ee4898878415565b4e49a
[https://perma.cc/97ZEGZBR].
114. Kimberly Kindy, Kevin Schaul & Ted Mellnik, Half of the Nation’s Largest Police
Departments Have Banned or Limited Neck Restraints Since June, WASH. POST (Sept. 6,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/national/police-use-of-forcechokehold-carotid-ban/ [https://perma.cc/MR3T-8JQX]; see also, e.g., DENVER POLICE DEP’T,
OPERATIONS MANUAL § 105.00, https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/
720/documents/OperationsManual/OMSBook/OM_Book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G5NZR9CV] (banning chokeholds and carotid restraints with no exceptions).
115. See, e.g., Grace Hauck, Chicago Revises Foot Chase Policy After Fatal Police
Shootings of Adam Toledo, Anthony Alvarez, USA TODAY (May 27, 2021, 3:41 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/05/27/chicago-police-unveil-new-footchase-policy-following-fatal-shootings/7465607002/
[https://perma.cc/NDQ4-ULKG]
(describing new limitations on foot pursuits implemented by the Chicago Police Department);
David A. Graham, Why Do Police Keep Shooting Into Moving Cars?, ATLANTIC (May 21,
2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/05/andrew-brown-police-shootingsmoving-vehicles/618938/ [https://perma.cc/59P9-W949] (describing policies by many
departments to prohibit or discourage shooting into moving cars, evidence that suggests these
types of bans reduce police killings, and the continued challenges of getting officers to follow
these policies).
116. Sharon R. Fairley, The Police Encounter with a Fleeing Motorist: Dilemma or
Debacle?, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 155, 202 n.293 (2018) (quoting GUIDING PRINCIPLES
ON USE OF FORCE, supra note 68, at 15).
117. Wesley Lowery, Lindsey Bever & Katie Mettler, Police Have Killed Nearly 200
People Who Were in Moving Vehicles Since 2015, Including 15-Year-Old Jordan Edwards,
POST
(May
3,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postWASH.
nation/wp/2017/05/03/police-have-killed-nearly-200-people-who-were-in-moving-vehiclessince-2015-including-15-year-old-jordan-edwards/ [https://perma.cc/992B-AENF].
118. See Fairley, supra note 116.
119. Lowery et al., supra note 117.
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vehicle.120 Similar policies changes in the Philadelphia and Miami Police
Departments have also been associated with fewer police shootings and no increased
threat to officer safety.121
5. Comprehensive Report Writing
Another important goal of reformers has been to require comprehensive reporting
of force incidents. Advocates urge police departments to require reporting, not just
of deadly force, but of all use of force, as well as attempted or threatened use of force.
President Obama’s Task Force recommended that agencies engage in comprehensive
reporting, including of nonlethal use of force.122 Campaign Zero has included
requiring comprehensive reporting in its top eight policies that set common-sense
limits on police use of force.123
Law enforcement agencies have seen success in decreasing use-of-force incidents
after requiring officers to report different levels of force. In 2015, NYPD saw a
historic low in police weapon discharges after the department mandated officers to
document any use of force.124 The San Francisco Police Department saw a nineteen
percent decrease in gun pointing at civilians approximately one year after
implementing a policy requiring officers to report every time officers point their
firearm at a person.125 A more extensive study of police-involved shooting deaths
between 2000 and 2015 found that mandated reporting of any firearm use would
reduce civilian deaths.126 The researchers estimated that if the ten agencies with the
highest civilian death rates had required officers to report every weapon drawn, at
least forty fewer people would have died.127
6. Favoring Peacemaker over Warrior-Style Training
Reformers have become increasingly aware that a key issue regarding use of force
is that police officers are trained to escalate conflict and rely too readily on deadly
force.128 This type of training, which emphasizes threats to officer survival, has been

120. Id. The 2016 Orlando Police Department policy was not a complete ban on shooting
into moving vehicles and allowed officers to still fire their weapons if the individual was
“threatening the officer with deadly force with a weapon other than the vehicle.” David Harris,
Orlando Police Change Policy of Officers Shooting into Moving Vehicles, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(Sept. 8, 2016, 10:09 AM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/osorlando-police-shooting-vehicle-policy-20160906-story.html [https://perma.cc/4PJJ-PDMQ].
121. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE, supra note 68, at 47.
122. See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 65, at 21–22.
123. Campaign Zero, supra note 77.
124. Abanonu, supra note 99, at 249.
125. Vivian Ho, SF Police Too Quick to Go for Their Guns, Critics Say, S.F. CHRON. (May
27, 2017, 6:44 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/SF-police-too-quick-to-gofor-their-guns-critics-11178630.php [https://perma.cc/GF22-NGJH].
126. Jennings & Rubado, supra note 88, at 222.
127. Id.
128. For example, in a recent study of police training videos, Ion Meyn identified how
trainings urged officers to “always bring deadly force” to their encounters and to not hesitate
to use higher levels of force. Ion Meyn, The Invisible Rules that Govern Use of Force, 2021
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referred to as “warrior-style training.”129 Warrior training focuses on preparing
officers to kill, promotes the use of violence when arresting suspects, and warns
officers that those “killed in the line of duty use less force than their peers.”130
The “warrior” mentality is embedded into police officers from the first day of
training.131 Officers are taught that “everyone they meet may have a plan to kill them”
and to shoot before a threat is fully in front of them because waiting until the last
minute may be too late.132 In one example of warrior training that received
considerable public scrutiny, the Kentucky State Police Department quoted Adolf
Hitler advocating violence, and urged officers to “always fight to the death.”133 A
PowerPoint slide included in the training instructed Kentucky police officers to be
“ruthless killer[s]” and to “meet violence with greater violence.”134 This kind of fearbased training emphasizes compliance over cooperation and “promotes an
adversarial style of policing that estranges the public and contributes to unnecessary
conflict and violence.”135
A 2020 study surveyed patrol officers in two distinct U.S. police departments—a
midsize city in the Southeast and a larger city in the Southwest—to determine
whether “warrior” training results in measurable differences in attitude or behavior
of participating officers.136 The researchers compared the “warrior approach” to

WIS. L. REV. 593, 621 (quoting Reality Training: Staying in the Fight, POLICE1 BY LEXIPOL
(Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.police1.com/dave-smith/videos/reality-training-staying-in-thefight-KRq8uc0VwUeRO4sF/ [https://perma.cc/AN6Y-8ZRK].
129. See Seth W. Stoughton, How Police Training Contributes to Avoidable Deaths,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/police-gunshooting-training-ferguson/383681 [https://perma.cc/2HQH-5LG8].
130. Kimberly Kindy, Creating Guardians, Calming Warriors: A New Style of Training
for Police Recruits Emphasizes Techniques to Better De-Escalate Conflict Situations, WASH.
POST (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/12/10/newstyle-of-police-training-aims-to-produce-guardians-not-warriors
[https://perma.cc/JBE76UEC].
131. See SUE RAHR & STEPHEN K. RICE, FROM WARRIORS TO GUARDIANS: RECOMMITTING
AMERICAN POLICE CULTURE TO DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 4 (2015) (explaining that the “seeds” of
a warrior culture “are planted during recruit training, when some recruits are trained in an
academy environment that is modeled after military boot camp, a model designed to produce
a warrior ready for battle and ready to follow orders and rules without question”); see also
Seth Stoughton, Law Enforcement’s “Warrior” Problem, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 225, 228
(2015) [hereinafter Stoughton, Warrior]; Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior
Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 611, 639 (2016) [hereinafter
Stoughton, Principled Policing].
132. Stoughton, Warrior, supra note 131 (emphasis omitted).
133. Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Kentucky Police Training Quoted Hitler and Urged
‘Ruthless’ Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/31/us/
kentucky-state-police-hitler.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/WA6X-BMXA].
134. Satchel Walton & Cooper Walton, KSP Training Slideshow Quotes Hitler, Advocates
REDEYE
(Oct.
30,
2020),
‘Ruthless’
Violence,
MANUAL
https://manualredeye.com/90096/news/local/police-training-hitler-presentation/
[https://perma.cc/76EV-WF72] (containing a copy of the PowerPoint training).
135. Stoughton, Principled Policing, supra note 131, at 651, 654.
136. Kyle McLean, Scott E. Wolfe, Jeff Rojek, Geoffrey P. Alpert & Michael R. Smith,
Police Officers as Warriors or Guardians: Empirical Reality or Intriguing Rhetoric?, 37 JUST.
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training that prioritized officer protection and crime fighting with a “guardian
approach” to training that prioritized societal protection and building community
relationships.137 The study found that guardian officers had stronger communication
priorities during interactions with civilians, while warrior officers exhibited stronger
physical control priorities.138 Overall, their results suggest that guardian-oriented
officers were less likely, and warrior-oriented officers more likely, to use force when
inappropriate or unnecessary.139
Although debates about warrior-style trainings have gone on for some time, they
intensified after it was discovered that the officer who killed Philando Castile during
a routine traffic stop in Minneapolis had attended a popular two-day police training
called “The Bulletproof Warrior.”140 Instead of warrior-style training, reformers are
calling on departments to emphasize the role of police officers as peacemakers or
guardians. The goal of this new type of training is to emphasize that officers should
“treat people humanely,” “show them respect,” and “avoid causing unnecessary
indignity.”141 In one important example of such a reform, Minnesota adopted an
outright ban on “warrior-style training” following George Floyd’s murder.142 The
Minnesota law defines “warrior-style” training as training “that is intended to
increase a peace officer’s likelihood or willingness to use deadly force in encounters
with community members.”143

***
Presumably inspired by advocacy and evidence that restrictive use-of-force
policies reduce police killings, government officials in cities across the country have
called on their police departments to revise their police policies. Indeed, the 8 Can’t
Wait campaign has identified 352 law enforcement departments and nineteen states
that have adopted one or more of the campaign’s use-of-force policy priorities since
June of 2020.144 Yet, despite this historically unprecedented push to reform law
enforcement use-of-force policies, these types of reform efforts are also meeting

Q. 1096 (2020).
137. Id. at 1098.
138. Id. at 1112.
139. Id. at 1113.
140. Bryan Schatz, “Are You Prepared to Kill Somebody?” A Day with One of America’s
JONES
(Mar./Apr.
2017),
Most
Popular
Police
Trainers,
MOTHER
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/02/dave-grossman-training-policemilitarization/ [https://perma.cc/W8A3-7F2B].
141. Kindy, supra note 130 (quoting Seth Stoughton).
142. Ivan Pereira, Minnesota Leaders Ban Chokeholds, ‘Warrior Training’ in
Comprehensive Police Reform Bill, ABC NEWS (July 21, 2020, 2:44 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/minnesota-leaders-ban-chokeholds-warrior-trainingcomprehensive-police/story?id=71894416 [https://perma.cc/X4LK-N8NU].
143. Id.
144. See Email from Katie Ryan, Campaign Zero, to Joanna Schwartz (Oct. 14, 2021,
11:54 AM) (on file with authors); Campaign Zero, supra note 77 (listing nineteen states that
have adopted laws that include one or more of 8 Can’t Wait’s priority policies).
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some resistance.145 As we now describe in Part II, one of the most powerful forces
resisting reform to use-of-force standards is Lexipol LLC.
II. LEXIPOL’S OPPOSITION TO RESTRICTING POLICE POWER
Advocates and researchers agree that restricting police officers’ discretion to use
force will save lives. But these reforms are facing opposition by some unions and
law enforcement groups arguing that officers need to retain the massive discretion
offered by Graham.146 In lawsuits, legislative testimony, letters to government
leaders, and newsletters issued to their members, these groups have argued that
prohibiting chokeholds and changing the constitutional standard for excessive force
will make it more difficult for police to do their jobs and will threaten officer and
public safety.147
One of the most powerful opponents of use-of-force policy reform is Lexipol
LLC, a private company that crafts police policies and trainings for almost one-third
of law enforcement agencies across the country. Lexipol describes itself in
promotional materials as a risk management provider that creates policies and
trainings that comply with federal and state legal requirements, as well as best
practices. Lexipol claims that it employs “a rigorous yet collaborative development
and review process to ensure diverse perspectives—internal and external to our

145. See infra notes 146–48 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, USE OF FORCE POSITION PAPER:
LEGISLATIVE
CONSIDERATIONS
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
5
(May
2019),
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/201905/Use%20of%20Force%20Task%20Force%20Recommendations_Final%20Draft.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DT5Z-8PTJ] (“The IACP opposes any effort to alter the Graham v. Connor
standard. Any proposed legislation requiring police use of force only when ‘necessary’ is
presuming a level of officer influence over circumstances that does not exist and strives to
create a level of perfection that cannot possibly be obtained.”).
147. See, e.g., Complaint at 4, 21, Police Benevolent Ass’n of New York v. City of New
York, No. 653624/2020 (filed Aug. 5, 2020) (suing the City of New York for a newly enacted
chokehold ban, arguing that the ban “threatens both police and public safety” and “inflicts a
severe and unwarranted chilling effect on the ordinary performance of police duties of
apprehensions and arrests”); Letter from William J. Johnson, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Ass’n of Police
Orgs., to Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Chair, Comm. on the Judiciary, and Rep. Jim Jordan, Ranking
Member,
Comm.
on
the
Judiciary
(June
15,
2020),
http://www.napo.org/files/5015/9259/5171/NAPO_Letter_Justice_in_Policing_Act.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9A3D-LU9D] (expressing concern about proposed changes to Graham in
the Justice in Policing Act because it “will have a chilling effect on the men and women in
uniform”); Letter from Patrick Yoes, Nat’l President, Fraternal Ord. of Police, and Chief
Steven R. Casstevens, President, Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, to Att’y Gen. William Barr
(Sept. 24, 2020), https://fop.net/letter/u-s-attorney-general-barr-for-implementing-presidenttrumps-executive-order-on-safe-policing-for-safe-communities/
[https://perma.cc/5AZC953S] (expressing opposition to any adjustment of the Graham standard); NAPO Opposes Ban
on Riot Control Equipment, WASH. REP. Nat’l Ass’n of Police Orgs./Alexandria, Va., Sept.
18, 2020, at 3–4, http://www.napo.org/files/4816/0043/8967/Washington_Report__September_18_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/NTG2-SL43] (explaining the organization’s
opposition to a proposed bill to ban the use of riot control agents because “this bill puts our
members’ lives in danger”).
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company—are considered.”148 Yet, despite this diversity of input and these
representations of neutrality, we have found that Lexipol crafts its materials in ways
that maximize officer discretion as a means of minimizing legal liability.149 In the
current moment of reflection and reform, Lexipol has doubled down on this
retrograde position. Lexipol’s policies and public statements make clear that its
leadership has strong views on what use-of-force policies should and should not
contain—and these views stand in sharp opposition to those pushing for reform.
Although Lexipol has made some modest adjustments to their policies and
trainings in the wake of George Floyd’s murder,150 Lexipol’s formal policies and
trainings are crafted in ways that go against many of the reforms currently being
pressed by advocates and increasingly adopted by local governments. Lexipol’s
standard use-of-force policy retains maximum flexibility for law enforcement and
avoids placing any firm limits on officers’ power to use force. Lexipol’s other
publicly available materials take even more vigorous—and less diplomatic—stands
against reform proposals. And, when reforms have actually been proposed, such as
the California law to restrict force only when necessary, Lexipol has advocated to
limit the language of the bill ultimately passed and has further sought to limit the
impact of the bill once enacted through its advice to subscribers.
In this Part, we support these claims by describing Lexipol’s anti-reform
positions—as reflected in their publicly available use-of-force policies and training
materials, self-published articles, blog posts, white papers, webinars, and public
statements—regarding several of the key reforms currently being advanced by
advocates and governments. Then we describe Lexipol’s advocacy efforts in
response to proposed and enacted reforms, focusing on their efforts to undermine
California’s new law, which was intended to restrict deadly force to situations in
which it is deemed necessary.
A. Lexipol’s Use-of-Force Policy and Trainings
The cornerstone of Lexipol’s service for police and sheriff agencies is access to
Lexipol’s copyrighted policy manual, supplemented by short online trainings for
officers.151 Lexipol’s standard advertising pitch stresses the difficulty that local law
enforcement agencies have in creating their own policy manual. “You’re committed
to fair, equitable policing for every member of your community,” Lexipol writes on
its webpage, “[b]ut keeping up with changing legislation, expectations and training
requirements—while also keeping your officers safe and healthy—is resourceintensive and challenging for any law enforcement leader.”152 Lexipol offers a
solution—“170+ state-specific policies written by industry experts and kept up to

148. Police Use of Force: Safer Communities Through Sound Policies, LEXIPOL,
https://useofforce.lexipol.com/law-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/8GHE-PT99].
149. See generally Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 10.
150. See infra note 243 and accompanying text (describing one such change).
151. Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 894–95.
152. LEXIPOL, supra note 15.
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date as legislation and best practices change.”153 By subscribing to Lexipol,
customers “[r]educe risk with policies that align with state and federal laws.”154
Lexipol has created a model national master policy manual that it maintains is
based on constitutional standards.155 Lexipol then turns to state laws to create a
master manual for each state in which it has clients.156 As Lexipol explains, its
“policies are based on nationwide standards and best practices while also
incorporating state and federal laws and regulations where appropriate.”157 To
promote its policies in the wake of protests over George Floyd’s murder and police
use of force, in July 2020, Lexipol publicly released its national use-of-force policy
on a “use of force” page on its website.158
Lexipol supplements its policies with training modules that allow agencies to
“[m]eet training mandates with courses covering time-tested tactics and the latest hot
topics.”159 These signature Daily Training Bulletins (DTBs) are distributed to
Lexipol clients and take only a few minutes to complete.160 Officers can access these
quick trainings through Lexipol’s mobile app, or they can be integrated into daily
department roll call routines.161
In the discussion that follows, we describe Lexipol’s national policy on use of
force as well as several of its corresponding DTBs on using force. Our goal here is
to familiarize readers with how Lexipol articulates the use-of-force standard that
police officers should follow and how its trainings address the topic.
1. Policy 300
Lexipol’s national use-of-force policy, as well as all Lexipol state use-of-force
policies, are titled “Policy 300: Use of Force.”162 Lexipol’s Policy 300 contains three

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 903.
156. Id.
157. Policies & Updates, LEXIPOL, https://www.lexipol.com/solutions/policies-andupdates/ [https://perma.cc/YM6P-UE58].
158. LEXIPOL, ANYTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT: USE OF FORCE POLICY (July 10, 2020),
https://info.lexipol.com/National-Use-of-Force-Policy
[https://perma.cc/DBG7-5YP8]
[hereinafter Lexipol National Use of Force Policy]. Lexipol explains on its webpage that:
“This [use-of-force] policy is intended as a starting point for local governments and agencies
preparing policies for dealing with use of force. This is a national-level policy and references
holdings from federal case law but does not include applicable state or local requirements.”
Police Use of Force, LEXIPOL, https://useofforce.lexipol.com/policy/ [https://perma.cc/A2PHZ5JA].
159. LEXIPOL, supra note 15.
160. Better Policy Understanding in Just Minutes a Day, LEXIPOL,
https://www.lexipol.com/solutions/policy-training [https://perma.cc/CY2K-NDJ5]; see also
Shannon Pieper, 4 Ways to Integrate Policy into Police Training, LEXIPOL (July 5, 2017),
https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/4-ways-to-integrate-policy-into-police-training/
[https://perma.cc/MY3E-AX3X].
161. Pieper, supra note 160.
162. For a sampling of Lexipol’s use-of-force policy across several states, see LEXIPOL,
Lexipol Illinois Policy Manual: Policy 300—Use of Force (July 7, 2016),
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distinguishing features. First, Policy 300 embraces the Graham standard, providing
that officers should use force “that reasonably appears necessary given the facts and
circumstances perceived by the officer at the time of the event” and recognizing that
“officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force
that reasonably appears necessary in a particular situation.”163
Second, consistent with Lexipol’s overall approach, Lexipol’s national use-offorce policy retains maximal police discretion. As Bruce Praet, a former law
enforcement officer and one of Lexipol’s founders, explained in a recent webinar:
“One of our secret sauces, so to speak, is that rarely, if ever, will you see the use of
the word ‘shall’ in our policies.”164 Policy 300 is no exception: it includes a flexible
list of factors that can support use of force, including the “[i]mmediacy and severity
of the threat to officers or others,” the “individual’s mental state or capacity,” and
the “conduct of the individual being confronted, as reasonably perceived by the
officer at the time.”165 Notably, Lexipol does not require officers to exhaust
reasonable alternatives before resorting to using force. Instead, the standard language
emphasizes that police officers should have maximum discretion and that “no policy
can realistically predict every possible situation an officer might encounter.”166 As a
result, the policy counsels that “officers are entrusted to use well-reasoned discretion
in determining the appropriate use of force in each incident.”167
The third key feature of Lexipol’s use-of-force policy—consistent with its
embrace of Graham and maximum officer discretion—is its avoidance of bright-line
rules that ban certain practices. In apparent response to the protests and calls for
reform following the killing of George Floyd, Lexipol amended its policy on carotid

http://www.lexipol.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Use-of-Force.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
FG42-A77S]; LEXIPOL, Lexipol Pennsylvania Policy Manual: Table of Contents (Dec. 16,
2016),
http://www.lexipol.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/PA-LE-Policy-Manual_
TOC.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM2R-SXMV]; LEXIPOL, Policy 300—Use of Force, in DENTON
POLICE
DEPARTMENT:
MD
POLICY
MANUAL
(Sept.
15,
2020),
https://www.dentonmdpolice.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/RELEASE_20200915_
T110825_Denton_Police_Department_Policy_Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZGS2-4W2Q];
LEXIPOL, Policy 300—Use of Force, in WEST LAFAYETTE POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY
MANUAL (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.westlafayette.in.gov/egov/documents/1486153609
_21916.pdf [https://perma.cc/QXU7-8ZDT]; LEXIPOL, Policy 300—Use of Force, in CITY OF
SUNNYVALE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY: DEPARTMENT POLICIES (June 11, 2020),
https://sunnyvale.ca.gov/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=26744
[https://perma.cc/7DSD-HUZG].
163. Lexipol National Use of Force Policy, supra note 158, § 300.3. Lexipol’s statespecific policy manuals incorporate any state-law restrictions and requirements regarding the
use of force and other police practices. Lexipol’s state policies are not discussed here but see
infra notes 306–16 and accompanying text (describing how Lexipol has responded to changes
in California law regarding use-of-force standards).
164. Bruce Praet, Webinar: The “Act to Save Lives”: What Law Enforcement Needs to
Know About CA AB392, LEXIPOL, at 33:27 (Oct. 17, 2019), https://info.lexipol.com/webinarca-ab392 [https://perma.cc/KXW4-S65Z] (complete “Register Now” instructions, then follow
“View Now” hyperlink) [hereinafter Lexipol Webinar on AB 392].
165. Lexipol National Use of Force Policy, supra note 158, § 300.3.2.
166. Id. § 300.3.
167. Id.
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restraints to limit their use to instances when deadly force is authorized but continues
to maintain that “[t]he proper application of the carotid control hold may be effective
in restraining a violent or combative individual.”168 Nor does Lexipol’s standard
manual ban shooting into vehicles. Instead, it counsels that shooting at a moving
vehicle is “rarely effective” and suggests that officers should use the technique
“when the officer reasonably believes there are no other reasonable means available
to avert the threat of the vehicle, or if deadly force other than the vehicle is directed
at the officer or others.”169 In sum, Lexipol eschews the types of bright-line rules that
prohibit certain dangerous techniques, including them in their state policy manuals
only if they have been mandated by that state.170
2. Daily Training Bulletins
Lexipol offers its subscribers scores of Daily Training Bulletins (DTBs) to use
with their officers. To illustrate its approach to training officers about their power to
use force, we analyze three DTB training modules that Lexipol features on its
website. Each begins with a policing scenario and then asks a basic true/false
question that focuses on an aspect of Lexipol’s use-of-force policy. This format is
consistent with Lexipol’s general approach to DTBs. According to Lexipol’s former
vice president of Learning and Policy content, Don Weaver, Lexipol designs its
“training bulletins to focus on a specific aspect of the agency’s policy and present
them in the form of scenarios because we know this helps enhance learning
retention—the officers are being asked to consider how their policy works in the real
world.”171 Because Lexipol prioritizes training topics that agencies are “most likely
to get sued for,” use of force is one of the featured topics.172
One of Lexipol’s most popular DTBs,173 called “Factors to Determine
Reasonableness,” is based on a scenario involving a woman named Mary Craig who
is pulled over for a “minor but arrestable” traffic violation (Figure 1).174 Officers

168. Id. § 300.3.4.
169. Id. § 300.4.1.
170. For example, several states—including California—have recently passed laws
banning the use of carotid restraints under any circumstances. Harmeet Kaur & Janine Mack,
The Cities, States and Countries Finally Putting an End to Police Neck Restraints, CNN (June
16, 2020, 6:24 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/10/world/police-policies-neck-restraintstrnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/J86V-BGCT]. Lexipol’s California policy manual therefore
includes a ban on carotid restraints to comply with state law. See, e.g., CITY OF SUNNYVALE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY: DEPARTMENT POLICIES, supra note 162, § 300.3.4. In states
that do not have such a ban, Lexipol’s policy manual limits carotid restraints to instances when
deadly force is appropriate. Lexipol National Use of Force Policy, supra note 158, § 300.3.4.
171. Lexipol Team, “Reasonableness” in Police Use of Force Tops Lexipol’s 2018 Law
Enforcement Training Topics, LEXIPOL (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.lexipol.com/
resources/blog/reasonableness-in-police-use-of-force-tops-lexipol-2018-law-enforcementtraining-topics/ [https://perma.cc/D5H4-RAR5].
172. Pieper, supra note 160.
173. In 2018, the training topic most commonly relied on by departments was use of force.
Lexipol Team, supra note 171.
174. Sample Daily Training Bulletin: Factors to Determine Reasonableness, LEXIPOL
(Aug. 2016), http://www.lexipol.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/DTB_UOF_factors-to-
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have the “option of citing and releasing Ms. Craig or making a custodial arrest.” As
they speak with her, she “becomes increasingly agitated,” asks why she has been
stopped, and will not roll down her front window or get out of the car.175 Officers are
asked to consider whether to forcibly remove Ms. Craig from the car, despite the fact
that she “has provided the correct identifying information” and officers believe she
has done nothing wrong other than the minor traffic offense.176
Figure 1. Lexipol Daily Training Bulletin:
“Factors to Determine Reasonableness”

Rather than tell trainees how to de-escalate or handle the situation, Lexipol uses
this scenario as an opportunity to teach the Graham standard. Lexipol counsels that
officers should weigh a number of factors in determining whether to use force,
including “the conduct of the individual being confronted,” the “[s]eriousness of the
suspected offense,” the “risk and reasonably foreseeable consequence of escape,”
and the “[i]mmediacy and severity of the threat” to officers and others.177 Lexipol’s
training does not provide any tactical guidance about how to resolve this type of

determine-reasonableness.pdf [https://perma.cc/EVK9-HUPW].
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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situation without force, but rather is only limited to clarifying that officers have
maximum flexibility to use their discretion to decide what to do.
A second use-of-force training that Lexipol posts on its website is titled “Use of
Force Continuum” (Figure 2).178 This DTB addresses a scenario where police shoot
and kill a civilian. In the scenario, police respond to “a report of a disturbance at a
local tavern” and arrive to find an unnamed man in a parking lot “holding a baseball
bat.”179 Officers approach the man, who is swinging the bat, to “try to keep him calm”
and have a Taser “ready in case it’s needed.”180 As the police approach, the man
“rushes” at the officer with the bat.181 The officer draws his firearm and kills the man.
Figure 2. Lexipol Daily Training Bulletin:
“Use of Force Continuum”

The issue presented to officers by Lexipol in this training is not whether officers
could have approached the situation differently to avoid killing this man. Instead,
officers are asked about the filing of a civil rights lawsuit alleging excessive force
and whether the officers had any “legal responsibility” to try non-lethal force before
killing the unnamed man. The answer, according to Lexipol, is decidedly no. Lexipol
judges that the police killing was justified because “the man brandishing the baseball
bat determined what level of force you needed to use to counter his assault.”182
Without providing additional facts, Lexipol writes that the officer in this scenario

178. Sample Daily Training Bulletin, Use of Force: Use of Force Continuum, LEXIPOL
(Aug.
2016),
http://www.lexipol.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/DTB_UOF_forcecontinuum.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9MG-4THX].
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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“reasonably deduced that the suspect’s actions posed an immediate threat to the
safety of you and others present and you responded accordingly.”183
This training module provides an opportunity to refer readers to Lexipol’s Policy
300, which indicates that “[r]easonableness of the force used must be judged from
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time of the incident.”184
Officers learn that this standard of “objective reasonableness” comes from the
“landmark case” of Graham v. Connor, which takes “into consideration the totality
of the circumstances known to the officer(s) at the time, without the advantage of
20/20 hindsight.”185 Citing to additional Supreme Court and Circuit Court precedent,
Lexipol reassures trainees that “[f]ortunately, the rejection of any continuum of force
is now consistently reflected by almost every federal court.”186
Entirely ignored in the problem is the opportunity to discuss officer tactics,
including how officers could have de-escalated the situation so as to avoid killing
this man. For example, Lexipol does not examine whether the officers could have
instead engaged the man from a distance rather than approaching so closely. Nor
does Lexipol explore whether a Taser could have been used in lieu of a firearm.
Similarly, there is no consideration of whether the officers could have withdrawn or
checked for any background information on the individual before approaching.
These omissions underscore Lexipol’s focus on avoiding officer liability for police
shootings, instead of avoiding such shootings in the first instance.
The third use-of-force training that Lexipol provides the public on its webpage,
titled “Deadly Force Applications,” also involves a scenario of a police officer killing
a civilian (Figure 3).187 This scenario provides no facts at all leading up to the police
killing but does state that the man who is killed had a pistol. The DTB starts with the
officer wondering “How could I miss at this distance?” and exclaiming that the
officer “can’t believe he’s not down!”188 The officer then proceeds to kill the
individual with multiple rounds of ammunition.
Like the prior trainings, this DTB does not address what the officer could have
done to de-escalate or avoid this situation. Nor does it discuss what the officer should
do to assist the man he shot. Rather, the training focuses on the officer’s worry that
he “might be in trouble” and centers the lesson once again on the Graham standard.
Lexipol assures the trainees that “the number of rounds alone does not determine the
reasonableness of force.”189 Instead, “reasonableness will be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time of the incident” and should
be found to be reasonable because “[y]ou were protecting yourself from what you
reasonably believed was an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.”190
Although the training acknowledges that the officer may have shot the man “as he

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Sample Daily Training Bulletin, Use of Force: Deadly Force Applications, LEXIPOL
(Aug. 2016), http://www.lexipol.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/DTB_UOF_deadly-forcefactors.pdf [https://perma.cc/W84Z-MXXL].
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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was falling” or “after he fell,” Lexipol reminds trainees that each round “appeared
necessary given the facts and circumstances you perceived at the time.”191
Figure 3. Lexipol Daily Training Bulletin:
“Deadly Force Applications”

The Lexipol policies and trainings just described maximize officer flexibility to
use force and focus on officers’ avoidance of legal liability. They do not incorporate
the kinds of reforms called for by policing experts and advocacy groups. As we
described in Part I, those advocating for police use-of-force policy reforms have
identified many ways in which police policies contribute to police violence. To
correct this problem, experts have proposed a range of policy revisions. These
proposals include limiting the use of force only to circumstances in which it is
necessary and using the least amount of force necessary under the circumstances.
They also include adopting a range of bright-line rules to prohibit the use of force in
certain scenarios, such as by prohibiting chokeholds or shooting at moving vehicles.
By producing policies and trainings that are silent on these alternatives known to
reduce police violence, Lexipol provides no structure for participating agencies to
consider these alternatives.
B. Lexipol’s Anti-Reform Stance
Lexipol’s policies and trainings for its thousands of subscribing agencies have
largely rejected recommended policy shifts, but Lexipol’s influence does not end
there. As we now discuss, Lexipol supplements its formal materials with a range of
educational outreach and persuasive materials that send a clear message that
Lexipol’s leaders believe these types of reforms are a bad idea. As just one example,
in response to growing calls for reform, in August of 2020, Lexipol launched a new

191. Id.
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portion of its website dedicated to its use-of-force policies.192 The company took the
opportunity to defend and justify its policy choices and explain that it has created
this forum to serve “as an informational hub for all stakeholders.”193 Through these
and other actions, Lexipol reveals itself to be not just a policymaker but also an active
and influential voice in the use-of-force debate.
Here, we describe central features of Lexipol’s anti-reform message that oppose
the six approaches to reform we introduced in Part I. This Subpart also sets out the
diverse ways in which Lexipol communicates that message to thousands of law
enforcement agencies and millions of law enforcement officials across the country.
As we show, Lexipol uses temperate language in white papers posted on its websites
and blunter language in its webinars and other communications directed to members.
1. Graham Is the Only Applicable Standard
Lexipol focuses much of its public advocacy on promoting the Graham standard.
According to Lexipol, Graham v. Connor is adequate guidance for police officers.
Lexipol consistently takes the position that departments should not adopt more
restrictive policies than that outlined in Graham. The company’s rationale appears
to be based on a view that a policy that is more restrictive than the “reasonableness”
guidelines established in Graham v. Connor will increase legal liability.
Lexipol uses diverse methods to get out its strong support of the Graham standard.
For example, in 2018, Lexipol published a white paper titled “Use of Force Policy:
Dispelling the Myths.”194 This white paper was written by Lexipol co-founder and
attorney Bruce Praet along with Lexipol Program Manager Mike Ranalli, and
consultants Laura Scarry and Ken Wallentine. The document was promoted by
Lexipol on Twitter.195 It was also distributed through Lexipol’s wider contacts in
policing circles, such as the Force Science Institute and Lexipol’s website, Police1.196
In the white paper, Lexipol claims it is a “myth” that increasing the force standard
benefits law enforcement. According to Lexipol, any policy that “boxes officers in

192. Lexipol Team, Lexipol Introduces Online Police Use of Force Policy Resource,
LEXIPOL (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/lexipol-introduces-onlinepolice-use-of-force-policy-resource/ [https://perma.cc/W6N5-NJRT]. Among other materials,
Lexipol published a new report on use of force that is available for download. See LEXIPOL,
supra note 148.
193. LEXIPOL, supra note 148.
194. LEXIPOL, USE OF FORCE POLICIES: DISPELLING THE MYTHS, https://perma.cc/S7FGBNVQ [hereinafter Dispelling the Myths by Lexipol].
195. @Lexipol, TWITTER (Dec. 14, 2017, 5:34 PM), https://twitter.com/Lexipol/
status/941436285042024453 [https://perma.cc/4NHV-U6TF].
196. See, e.g., Chuck Remsberg, White Paper Cites Dangerous Myths of Restrictive Use
of Force Policies, FORCE SCI. INST. (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.forcescience.org/
2017/11/white-paper-cites-dangerous-myths-of-restrictive-use-of-force-policies/
[https://
perma.cc/Q3M9-RWN8]; Fred, Use of Force Policy: Dispelling the Myths by Lexipol, LAW
ENF’T & SEC. CONSULTING BLOG (Nov. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/6DBD-8UXP; Mike
Callahan, 3 Myths About Officer-Involved Shootings, POLICE1 BY LEXIPOL (Mar. 30, 2018),
https://www.policeone.com/evergreen/articles/3-myths-about-officer-involved-shootingsInn9w3PqOMbyGEYo/ [https://perma.cc/J6YJ-828S].
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is likely to create—not solve—legal issues for the agency.”197 Straying from the
Graham standard “can easily confuse [juries] and lead to an incorrect standard being
applied to [an] officer’s actions.”198 Lexipol concedes that modifying a use-of-force
policy may “appease advocacy groups and members of the public who are quick to
scrutinize agency use of force policies”199 and “garner political points.”200
Nonetheless, Lexipol’s consistent message is that departments should ignore these
calls for reform because “[a]gencies are much better off keeping their use of force
policies aligned with the objective reasonableness standard outlined in Graham v.
Connor.”201
Lexipol has also relied on its employees and consultants to author news articles
on its website that communicate the policy preference for Graham. For example,
Michael Ranalli wrote an article titled “Countering the Critics: Responses to
Common Arguments about Police Use of Deadly Force,” which originally appeared
in The Chief’s Chronicle, a publication of the New York State Association of Chiefs
of Police, and was then reprinted by Lexipol on its webpage.202 In that article, Ranalli
defends the Graham standard on the ground that it protects officers from liability:
The Graham standard works and results in the proper outcome in the
majority of cases involving police use of deadly force. Many of those
cases do not wind up in court because the rules worked, and the officers
acted reasonably. Or they are brought but the courts apply the proper
standard and find the officers’ actions to be reasonable.203
In another piece, Ranalli argues that “[s]ince officers may already be at a
disadvantage, the last thing agencies should do is to create overly restrictive use of
force policies that may not be possible for officers to adhere to.”204 Ranalli further
explains that, although reforms called for by advocates “may sound good and may
appease some in the community,” they are “not effective.”205 Police executives

197. Dispelling the Myths by Lexipol, supra note 194, at 5.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Bruce Praet, National Consensus Policy on Use of Force Should Not Trigger Changes
to Agency Policies, LEXIPOL (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/usecaution-when-changing-use-of-force-policy-language/
[https://perma.cc/N7LL-26BT]
[hereinafter Praet, National Consensus Policy].
201. Dispelling the Myths by Lexipol, supra note 194, at 7.
202. Michael Ranalli, Countering the Critics: Responses to Common Arguments About
Police Use of Deadly Force, CHIEF’S CHRON. (N.Y. State Ass’n of Chiefs of Police,
Schenectady, N.Y.), June 2018, at 5–7, https://www.nychiefs.org/assets/docs/
JUNE2018Chroniclewebversion-1.pdf, reprinted in LEXIPOL (July 6, 2018),
https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/responses-common-arguments-police-use-deadlyforce/ [https://perma.cc/UN2J-DP94] [hereinafter Ranalli on Countering the Critics].
203. Id.
204. Michael Ranalli, Police Use of Force: Reality vs. Law, LEXIPOL (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/police-use-of-force-reality-vs-law/
[https://perma.cc/6XVL-GA6G] [hereinafter Ranalli, Reality vs. Law].
205. Id.
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should not try “to change human behavior with mere words in a policy.”206 Instead,
they should maintain policies that are less restrictive, train their officers, and then
“hope that they make sound tactical decisions.”207 The view that restrictive use-offorce policies cannot influence officers’ behavior—a view Ranalli has shared in
multiple Lexipol blog posts208—is flatly contradicted by decades of research
indicating that such policies can, in fact, reduce police violence.209
Bruce Praet underscores his endorsement of use-of-force policies based on
Graham in a webinar directed to Lexipol subscribers punctuated with crass language.
In the webinar, this is how Praet explained that nothing should matter in evaluating
use of force other than objective reasonableness under Graham: “I don’t care if you
run him over with your police car. I don’t care if you smack him with your baton,
choke him out, tase him, bite him, shoot him. One question: Was it objectively
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances presented at the time?”210 On
Lexipol’s website, this on-demand webinar is described as a “frank discussion” with
Praet about use-of-force policies—a characterization that undersells the off-color
manner in which he describes the latitude offered by Graham.
2. No Requirement of De-Escalation Before Using Force
Lexipol has come out as a strong opponent to an emerging consensus on the need
to require de-escalation techniques. In a widely circulated Lexipol white paper on
use of force, the company claims it is a “myth” that “use of force policies should
require the use of de-escalation tactics.”211 Lexipol claims that reformers have
“latched onto the concept of de-escalation” due to “many high-profile police
shootings over the last several years,” but warns that any policy requiring deescalation is misguided.212 Time and time again, Lexipol criticizes reformers as
portraying de-escalation as “the singular answer to reducing police use of force.”213
In a training sponsored jointly with the Force Science Institute, Lexipol goes a
step further, arguing that de-escalation should sometimes be discouraged. In this

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. E.g., Michael Ranalli, Police Use of Force: The Need for the Objective
(Mar.
24,
2017),
Reasonableness
Standard,
LEXIPOL
https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/police-use-of-force-need-objective-reasonablenessstandard/ [https://perma.cc/WJ5U-X8RA] (arguing that moving away from the objective
reasonableness standard “will not have the desired effect on officer’s behavior”).
209. See supra notes 88, 95–101, 107–08, 116–21, 124–27, 136–39 and accompanying text
(describing research).
210. Bruce Praet, Still Clinging to a Use of Force Continuum or Labeling Force Levels?
You’re at Risk!, LEXIPOL, at 28:57 (Aug. 30, 2016), https://info.lexipol.com/use-of-forcecontinuum (complete “Register Now” instruction then follow “View Now” hyperlink)
[https://perma.cc/6WVS-CJ8Q] [hereinafter Still Clinging to a Continuum Webinar].
211. Dispelling the Myths by Lexipol, supra note 194, at 13.
212. Id.
213. Michael Ranalli, Do Police Officers Have a Legal Obligation to Use De-Escalation
Tactics?, LEXIPOL (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/do-policeofficers-have-a-legal-obligation-to-use-de-escalation-tactics/ [https://perma.cc/45SL-V4LP]
[hereinafter Ranalli, De-Escalation Tactics].
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training, presenters Michael Ranalli and Bill Lewinski, founder of the Force Science
Institute, contend that de-escalation can be appropriate for “a person in crisis” but
generally should not be used for “a criminal suspect”:214
It’s not that you’d never use de-escalation or conflict communications on
criminal suspects, but caution must be used in that you do not necessarily
want to lose the first—and possibly best—opportunity to take the person
into custody. When you have a noncompliant criminal suspect, deescalation tactics can actually backfire, slowing things down, and give
them the advantage and increase the risk to you.215
For Lexipol, all issues come back to the Graham standard. Lexipol advises its
subscribers that courts do not require de-escalation tactics or the least intrusive
means, so long as “the force used was objectively reasonable.”216 Officers need only
follow this minimal standard and policy manuals should too.
Lexipol co-founder, Bruce Praet, cautions against mandatory de-escalation in a
blog post on the company’s webpage:
While “de-escalation” has become the latest buzzword and is
conceptually advisable, agencies must exercise extreme caution when
mandating action with the use of inflexible “shalls.” Recognizing that
critics and attorneys will inevitably argue that de-escalation or other
action was ultimately “possible and appropriate,” the Supreme Court in
Graham cautioned against using the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. As such,
it is essential that every aspect of every use of force policy retain the
critical “reasonably believes” qualifier. It’s also why Lexipol policy
clearly defines the difference between “shall” and “should” and cautions
against the unnecessary use of “shall.”217
In another Lexipol webinar, attorneys Laura Scarry and Ken Wallentine discuss
the killing of Philando Castile, a Black man shot in a traffic stop. Mr. Wallentine
criticizes “so-called experts” who he contends “rushed to claim that de-escalation
training could have altered the outcome and could have prevented the shooting.”218
Discounting that de-escalation could have saved Castile’s life, Wallentine concludes
that “some situations simply evolve too rapidly to allow time for any de-escalation
efforts.”219 Ms. Scarry then cautions listeners to “make sure you’re not adding any

214. Bill Lewinski & Mike Ranalli, De-Escalation: When & How to Make It Work,
LEXIPOL, at 8:23 (May 10, 2018), https://info.lexipol.com/webinar-deescalation-FSI (complete
“Register Now” instructions then follow “View Now” hyperlink) [https://perma.cc/89AK2P3Y].
215. Id. at 8:39.
216. Ranalli, De-Escalation Tactics, supra note 213.
217. Praet, National Consensus Policy, supra note 200 (emphasis omitted).
218. Laura Scarry & Ken Wallentine, A Rational Approach to Incorporating DeEscalation into Policy, LEXIPOL, at 6:00 (Sept. 12, 2017), http://info.lexipol.com/deescalationwebinar-on-demand (complete “Register Now” instructions then follow “View Now”
hyperlink) [https://perma.cc/8WCL-5UQM].
219. Id. at 6:23.
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additional standards to your use-of-force policy. That policy is best written to align
with the Graham v. Connor standards and not [to] require officers to move along any
kind of use-of-force continuum.”220
3. No Use-of-Force Continuum
Although reformers have pushed law enforcement to adopt use-of-force
continuums that encourage the proportional use of force and limit the amount of force
used by officers, Lexipol has never incorporated a continuum into its policies or
trainings. Moreover, Lexipol has been vocal in its opposition to the very idea of a
continuum.
Lexipol’s white paper on use of force underscores its view that officers should not
be required to “follow a continuum before using force.”221 Quite simply: “Don’t
require officers to move along any kind of use of force continuum.”222 Instead,
Lexipol urges that police departments subscribe to their service and adopt “legally
sound” policies that are “based on Fourth Amendment principles rather than more
restrictive and possibly unattainable standards.”223 This kind of wide latitude to use
force and rejection of use-of-force continuums runs counter to reformers pushing to
reduce the use of force and lacks empirical evidence.224
Lexipol’s objection to continuums appears to be rooted in its concern about
erosion of the Graham reasonableness standard by reforms that encourage officers
“to use or even consider the least intrusive means available.”225 As Lexipol posted
on its website defending its anti-continuum stance in the wake of increasing public
cries to incorporate use-of-force continuums, “[n]either case law nor state legislation
requires the adoption of use of force continuums within policy. Accordingly,
Lexipol’s Policy 300 on use of force does not include a continuum, instead following
precedent set by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor that force must be
‘objectively reasonable.’”226
Lexipol also gets its message out in more direct terms through webinars. One such
webinar taught by Bruce Praet features the catchy title “Still Clinging to a Use of
Force Continuum or Labeling Force Levels? You’re at Risk!”227 The webinar is
described as emphasizing that continuums are “outdated” and “ill-advised” and

220. Id. at 31:08.
221. Dispelling the Myths by Lexipol, supra note 194, at 16.
222. Id. at 19.
223. Michael Ranalli, Police Use of Force Policy: Civil vs. Criminal Liability
Considerations, LEXIPOL (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/police-useof-force-policy-civil-vs-criminal-liability-considerations/ [https://perma.cc/A28M-P4QU].
224. See Lorie Fridell, Steve Ijames & Michael Berkow, Taking the Straw Man to the
Ground: Arguments in Support of the Linear Use-of-Force Continuum, POLICE CHIEF (Dec.
2011),
https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/taking-the-straw-man-to-the-ground/
[https://perma.cc/M3NM-VVE3] (critiquing proponents of what the authors call the “just be
reasonable” view that argues against continuums and in favor of simply following a
reasonableness standard).
225. Ranalli, De-Escalation Tactics, supra note 213.
226. LEXIPOL, supra note 148.
227. Still Clinging to a Continuum Webinar, supra note 210.
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warns listeners that adopting one “creates legal trouble, even if an officer’s actions
are reasonable.”228 As Praet bluntly tells webinar participants: “All of this stuff about
continuums of force and escalation scales . . . that’s all hogwash. . . . Get rid of the
continuums of force. You cannot put a real-life situation into an artificial graph or
whatever.”229
In another webinar, Praet got this same point across with far coarser language:
I’m gonna shoot myself for even using this term, but this escalation of
force, this continuum of force—by the way if I ever hear any of you using
a continuum of force, I will personally choke your ass out and it will be
objectively reasonable for me to have done so.230
He then assures listeners that they should “[p]urge [their] brains of this whole
continuum concept; you will never find that anywhere in our policies because you
can’t fit a square peg into a round hole.”231
4. No Bright-Line Rules
Lexipol vehemently opposes bright-line restrictions on officers’ use of force. As
Gordon Graham, one of Lexipol’s founders, explains: “There are not really any
simple, bright-line rules for use of force or tactical decisions.”232 Lexipol’s Michael
Ranalli agrees: “Policy language that definitively prohibits an action will inevitably
result in a situation where an officer violates the policy under reasonable
circumstances, which in turn can create issues that must be dealt with if litigation
results.”233 As a result, Lexipol’s model policies retain officer discretion and the
company resists bans of any police practices.234
Retaining officer discretion is essential, according to Lexipol, to protect officers
and departments from liability. As Michael Ranalli counsels: “You don’t draft policy
when you know that there can be exceptions to that policy.”235 The “[b]ottom line”

228. Id.
229. Id. at 27:29.
230. Bruce Praet, Think You’re Ready to Testify? How to Effectively Prepare for
Depositions & Cross-Examinations, GOTOWEBINAR, at 40:22 (Apr. 17, 2017),
https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/6545965947007305218 [https://perma.cc/AV5KZG2C] (complete “Register” instructions then follow “Register” hyperlink) [hereinafter Think
You’re Ready to Testify Webinar].
231. Id. at 40:38.
232. Gordon Graham, Law Enforcement Officers and the 21-Foot Rule, LEXIPOL, at 1:25
(Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.lexipol.com/resources/todays-tips/law-enforcement-officersand-the-21-foot-rule/ [https://perma.cc/PYM7-7CC4].
233. Michael Ranalli, Why PERF’s Prohibition on Shooting at Vehicles Sells Agencies
Short, LEXIPOL (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/why-perfsprohibition-on-shooting-at-vehicles-sells-agencies-short-2/ [https://perma.cc/ZNF6-QFH3].
234. See id.
235. Michael Ranalli, Priority of Life: A Model for Improving Officer Safety and Reducing
Risk, LEXIPOL at 58:41 (July 27, 2016), https://info.lexipol.com/improve-officer-safety-wbn
(complete “Register Now” instructions then follow “View Now” hyperlink)
[https://perma.cc/WLF8-GVFC].
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here is that “[c]ompletely banning behavior may come back on you.”236 For example,
Lexipol believes that policies banning shooting at moving vehicles are a bad idea
because “there are times when shooting at a moving vehicle is appropriate.”237 When
departments adopt such policies and the policy is violated, this “places the officer
and the agency on the defensive should litigation develop from an incident.”238 In a
recent “Tip from Lexipol,” co-founder Gordon Graham further underscored this
point for his “cop friends,” warning: “I’ve seen policies around America—‘shall
never shoot at a moving vehicle.’ That makes me very nervous. You know, there are
going to be some times when we have to do something.”239 As Lexipol further
clarifies on its webpage, the push by “police reformers” to ban police shooting at
moving vehicles “does not align with Supreme Court case law as well as numerous
cases in federal circuits” finding such shootings to be reasonable.240
In response to the public outcry over the use of a neck restraint on George Floyd,
Lexipol did clarify its policy on carotid restraints. But rather than ban the practice,
Lexipol’s policy now limits carotid restraints to situations where deadly force may
be used—except in jurisdictions where the practice has been banned by the state
legislature.241 In fact, Lexipol continues to defend the practice, explaining that the
carotid restraint “has been an acceptable force option for many law enforcement
agencies for decades”242 and claiming that “[m]edical evidence supports the carotid
control hold as safer compared to other control techniques or the use of impact
weapons.”243
5. Litigation-Focused Report Writing
In apparent response to reformers’ calls for comprehensive reporting of force
incidents, Lexipol’s use-of-force website proudly proclaims that “[c]omprehensive
reporting of police use of force, including threats to use force, is a key component of

236. Ranalli, supra note 233.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Lexipol, Police Policy: Shooting at Moving Vehicles - Today’s Tip from Lexipol,
YOUTUBE, at 00:05 (Apr. 20, 2021), https://youtu.be/hR6roPchRZs [https://perma.cc/HQ2TSMCL].
240. LEXIPOL, supra note 148.
241. Id. For examples of states that have banned chokeholds, see Assemb. 1196, 2019-20
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (banning chokeholds); H.R. 350, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Del. 2020) (banning chokeholds); Assemb. 3, 2020 Leg., 32nd Spec. Sess. (Nev. 2020)
(banning chokeholds); H.R. 5007, 2020 Leg., 5th Spec. Sess. (Utah 2020) (banning
chokeholds); S. 219, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2020) (banning chokeholds); Assemb.
6144, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020) (making chokeholds that result in injury or
death a crime). Other states have adopted laws that are consistent with Lexipol’s approach.
See, e.g., H.R. 2647, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2020) (limiting chokeholds to times
when deadly force is necessary); H.R. 4203, 80th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Or. 2020) (limiting
chokeholds to times when deadly force is necessary).
242. LEXIPOL, CAROTID RESTRAINT 1 (Aug. 2020), https://info.lexipol.com/
uofm/position_Lexipol_Carotid-Restraint.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8T7-THJU].
243. LEXIPOL, supra note 148.
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transparency and accountability,” and a key component of their policies.244 Yet these
platitudes are in stark contrast to Lexipol’s repeated instructions to officers to prepare
reports with litigation in mind. Lexipol’s communications with subscribers have
repeatedly emphasized officers’ reports as crucial information “to ensuring your
success in court,” not for truth seeking and accountability.245
A 2020 Lexipol webinar on officer use-of-force statements emphasizes the need
to write reports that “support investigative priorities.”246 That is, in writing reports,
officers should go back to basics and consider the Graham objective reasonableness
standard.247 Because Graham looks to whether the conduct was objectively
reasonable under the circumstances, reports should include “pre-event context
information” that will help the officer to frame “the key points that were critical to
him in this moment.”248 As cofounder Bruce Praet explains in a 2016 training on
what to do when you shoot someone, the inclusion of “state of mind” in the officer’s
statement is key to winning lawsuits because the statement is “going to be the script
in the civil case down the road.”249
Not only does Lexipol want officers to frame reports around the Graham standard
but the company has also advised officers to reduce discoverable information about
use-of-force incidents. Praet advocates against officers using text messages to
communicate because such communications are discoverable in litigation. Instead,
he suggests that officers talk over the radio.250
Lexipol’s trainings also instruct departments to frame documentation so it looks
better for a jury. One disturbing piece of advice that founder Praet conveys in Lexipol
materials is to clean up blood to make victims of police violence appear less
injured.251 For example, in a webinar on how to write more effective police reports
Praet had this to say:

244. Id.
245. Lexipol Team, How to Write Effective Police Use of Force Reports, LEXIPOL (Nov.
11, 2019), https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/how-to-write-effective-police-use-offorce-reports/ [https://perma.cc/6R6H-24GP].
246. Mike Ranalli & Paul Taylor, Officer Use of Force Statements: Considerations to
00:15 (Feb.
18,
2020),
Support
Investigative
Priorities,
LEXIPOL, at
https://info.lexipol.com/webinar-officer-use-of-force-statements
[https://perma.cc/65MQH7WL] (complete “Register Now” instructions then follow “View Now” hyperlink).
247. Id. at 29:46–30:20, 41:31.
248. Id. at 47:15–47:34 (emphasis added).
249. I Just Shot Someone. What’s Next?, LEXIPOL at 32:20 (Nov. 15, 2016),
https://info.lexipol.com/just-shot-someone-whats-next (complete “Register Now” instructions
then follow “View Now” hyperlink) [https://perma.cc/434S-C7HW] [hereinafter I Just Shot
Someone Webinar].
250. Think You’re Ready to Testify Webinar, supra note 230, at 27:00 (“You know, I
always tell cops the death of law enforcement as we know it today is going to be social media
and technology. It’s great, but . . . those text messages that you’re sending back and forth—
does anybody ever use the radio anymore?”).
251. See Lexipol Team, supra note 245 (“Render medical aid first, then photograph the
clean, injured areas of the suspect, yourself, and any others involved, such as your K9. Take
photos of the non-injured areas of the suspect to ensure they don’t claim further injuries later.
Document their emotional state following the incident; a photograph of a smiling suspect or
one flashing a gang sign is important evidence in court.”).
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Take your pictures but please clean him up. Now, if some of you have
learned half a lesson, you clean him up but you’re leaving the bloody
gauze on either side of the photo. There’s a simple formula, you all need
to commit this to memory. Red turns to green at the time of trial. If there
is blood in the photo, you are going to pay money. Clean him up and get
him smiling for the picture.252
Praet concludes: “Get ’em smiling, pointing to their ‘oh-so-painful’ injuries; we use
that in court later, it is good stuff.”253
Lexipol’s other recommendations about report writing also pertain to their
hallmark concern of reducing agency liability. For instance, Lexipol has weighed
into the debate about allowing officers to view bodycam footage before writing a
report or providing a statement.254 Civil rights organizations have opposed
department policies that enable review of video footage before writing a report and
cite research that shows that watching videos can change how people remember
events.255 Bruce Praet has a different view. He explains in a webinar on the topic, “I
am a huge believer in letting the officer view the video before they write their report,
before they give their statement.”256 Thus, Lexipol consistently advises its member
agencies to give officers access to videos and other documentation before writing
their reports. Doing so is essential, according to Lexipol, to avoid losing police
misconduct lawsuits.257
Finally, Lexipol is also careful to clarify that taking a statement should not be
mandatory. Statements by officers “may actually create discrepancies.”258 Therefore,
departments shouldn’t “take a statement just to check a box.”259 Instead, video or
witnesses “may be enough, as long as [agencies] are not short cutting the
investigation process.”260

252. Bruce Praet, It’s Your Story: Tips for Writing More Effective Police Reports, LEXIPOL
at 30:52 (Feb. 5, 2019), https://info.lexipol.com/webinar-police-reports (complete “Register
Now” instructions then follow “View Now” hyperlink) [https://perma.cc/7TPQ-2Q9G].
253. Id. at 31:37.
254. For a primer on this issue, see Jay Stanley & Peter Bribing, Should Officers Be
Permitted to View Body Camera Footage Before Writing Their Reports?, ACLU (Jan. 13,
2015, 12:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/should-officers-be-permitted-viewbody-camera-footage-writing-their-reports [https://perma.cc/2DPL-9KKJ].
255. See, e.g., Harlan Yu & Miranda Bogen, The Illusion of Accuracy: How Body-Worn
Camera Footage Can Distort Evidence, UPTURN (Nov. 2017), https://www.upturn.org/
reports/2017/the-illusion-of-accuracy/ [https://perma.cc/A8BY-6HA4].
256. Think You’re Ready to Testify Webinar, supra note 230, at 17:18.
257. Force Science Institute, 10 Ways to Lose Police Lawsuits, POLICE1 BY LEXIPOL (Feb.
21, 2018), https://www.policeone.com/evergreen/articles/10-ways-to-lose-police-lawsuits1sld5IzGrEqfrvTG/ [https://perma.cc/2ZND-G54R].
258. Mike Ranalli & Paul Taylor, 3 Considerations When Taking Officer Use of Force
Statements, LEXIPOL (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/3considerations-when-taking-officer-use-of-force-statements/
[https://perma.cc/6AUY3AVM].
259. Id.
260. Id.
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6. Favoring Warrior-Style over Peacemaker Training
Lexipol’s educational materials promote a warrior—rather than a guardian—
philosophy of policing and seek to justify rather than limit police use of force.
Lexipol’s various training and educational materials epitomize the warrior model. In
an advertisement for its use-of-force trainings, Lexipol selects a photograph of
heavily armed force members dressed in military combat-style fatigues (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Image from Lexipol Educational Materials

The content of Lexipol’s trainings primes and prepares officers to use force.
Lexipol counsels officers to “train like you fight.”261 Departments should place
officers in “[i]ntensive and realistic scenario-based training” and those “scenarios”
in the use-of-force context are often of officers shooting and killing people.262 It is
important that these scenario-based trainings teach officers “to fight” and “to win.”263
To do so, as Lexipol’s cofounder Gordon Graham explains, officers must be primed
and ready to use violence in response to threat:
Tunnel vision, increased heart rate, rapid breathing, the body takes over
and you’re along for the ride. The threat is real, but your response
depends on your level of preparation. You revert to what you know,
whether it’s using a firearm, empty hand techniques, or even a call for a
backup. None of these efforts produce results without training and not all
training will prepare you.264
Lexipol also warns officers about “cop killers” and subscribes to a logic that
people have killed officers “because they knew they could.”265 This framing portrays

261. Gordon Graham, Train Like You Fight, LEXIPOL (Sept. 3, 2019),
https://www.lexipol.com/resources/todays-tips/train-like-you-fight/ [https://perma.cc/U7F5JF9R].
262. Id. at 1:16.
263. Id. at 2:17.
264. Id. at 0:52.
265. Id. at 2:01.
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officers who are killed in the line of duty as weak: “They sized up the officer and
attacked a perceived weakness.”266 If officers want to survive and “go home after
every shift” they need to “play like [they] practice.”267 As Bruce Praet concludes: “In
order to stay alive, the cop has to suspect the worst and hope for the best.”268
Lexipol’s warrior stance is apparent in its repeated characterization of police
killings as “good shooting[s].” For example, in a training about “what’s next” after
“I just shot someone,” Lexipol co-founder Bruce Praet justifies police violence,
saying that “99.9%” of police shootings are what he calls “good shooting[s].”269
Lexipol’s trainings even provide glamorous visuals of “good shooting[s],” like the
one in Figure 5 which was included in a PowerPoint presentation by Bruce Praet.270
This photograph, which is captioned, “GOOD SHOOTING?,” features an officer
shooting at close range into a vehicle.
Figure 5. Image from Lexipol Educational Materials

C. Lexipol’s Advocacy Against Reform
Although Lexipol presents itself as a neutral writer of “legally defensible,
continuously updated policies and training,”271 the previous sections have shown that

266. Id. at 2:12.
267. Id. at 2:21.
268. Think You’re Ready to Testify Webinar, supra note 230, at 6:12.
269. I Just Shot Someone Webinar, supra note 249, at 32:00.
270. Still Clinging to a Continuum Webinar, supra note 210; Lexipol, Still Clinging to a
Use of Force Continuum or Labeling Force Levels? You’re at Risk!, LEXIPOL 1, 7 (July 2016),
https://perma.cc/QJ5C-7BV7.
271. LEXIPOL, supra note 15.
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Lexipol has an agenda. Its policies and trainings on use of force hew closely to the
minimum constitutional standard and do not incorporate the guidance and limitations
proposed by respected experts in the field. In this Subpart, we describe another way
in which Lexipol tries to advance its anti-reform agenda: Lexipol participates in the
political process to stop reforms from passing and, when they do pass, Lexipol works
to minimize their impact.
As use of force has become a topic of heightened concern around the country,
Lexipol has not stayed quiet. Instead, Lexipol has used its powerful position as a
writer of police policies in thirty-five states to sound off against reform proposals.
This trend has been present for some time. For example, when the Police Executive
Research Forum published its 30 Guiding Principles for Improving Law Enforcement
in 2016, Lexipol spoke out against the use-of-force proposals in the report.272 The
following year, Lexipol publicly opposed the proposals contained in the National
Consensus Policy on Use of Force report issued by an influential group of national
law enforcement agencies.273 Lexipol suggested that the reforms proposed by both
law enforcement groups were dangerous and would result in increased agency
liability. As Lexipol’s Bruce Praet summed it up with regard to the National
Consensus Policy on Use of Force: “[W]e will always urge caution when any model
policy is released or new buzzword concepts threaten to create confusion for officers
and leaders alike.”274
Lexipol has also opposed and sought to undermine legislative efforts to reduce
police use of force. A key example occurred in California, a state where Lexipol
writes policies for ninety-five percent of police departments.275 Lexipol opposed
recent legislative efforts to revise the statewide standard on use of force. And, since
the state passed a reform to the use-of-force standard, Lexipol has worked to
minimize its impact.
In 2017, a historic bill was introduced in the California legislature to limit the use
of deadly force.276 As proposed, Assembly Bill 931 would have limited the use of
deadly force “to those situations where it is necessary,” meaning that it could only
be used “to defend against a threat of imminent and serious bodily injury or death to
the officer or to another person.”277 This reform would not only have prohibited the
use of deadly force when “an individual poses a risk only to himself or herself,” but

272. Michael Ranalli, Above and Beyond Graham v. Connor? Examining PERF’s Second
Guiding Principle, LEXIPOL (July 8, 2016), https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/beyondgraham-v-connor-examining-perfs-second-guiding-principle-2/
[https://perma.cc/TCZ9UVA5]; see also Michael D. Ranalli, Adding Perspective to the PERF Guiding Principles on
Use of Force: What Police Administrators Should Consider, CHIEF’S CHRON. (N.Y. State
Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Schenectady, N.Y.), June 2016, at 7–11,
https://www.nychiefs.org/assets/docs/June_16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DZA3-WZW2]
(advising that the PERF principles were “not suitable for immediate adoption by agencies
since further context is required”).
273. Praet, National Consensus Policy, supra note 200.
274. Id.
275. Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 893.
276. Assemb. 931, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
277. Id.
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also have significantly curtailed the ability to use deadly force against someone
fleeing from arrest.278
On March 18, 2018, while the bill was making its way through the legislature,
Stephon Clark was shot and killed by Sacramento police officers in the backyard of
his grandmother’s home.279 A twenty-two-year-old African American man, Clark
had a cell phone in his hand at the time.280 Sacramento police officers fired more than
twenty rounds at Stephon Clark, who was unarmed, hitting him eight times, primarily
in the back.281 The killing made national news and was investigated by the California
Attorney General.282
Assembly Bill 931’s limitation of police use of force to circumstances where it is
necessary was important, but not revolutionary.283 The language in the bill was
consistent with proposed recommendations by the Police Executive Research Forum,
Law Enforcement Action Partnership, Campaign Zero, Communities United Against
Police Brutality, and the Legal Defense Fund.284 Similar restrictions on officers’

278. Id.
279. XAVIER BECERRA, REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL REGARDING CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF STEPHON CLARK, OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., ST. OF CAL.
DEP’T OF JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/report-attorneygeneral-regarding-criminal-investigation-death-stephon-clark.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AEKGPNM].
280. Id. at 5.
281. Frances Robles & Jose A. Del Real, Stephon Clark Was Shot 8 Times Primarily in
His Back, Family-Ordered Autopsy Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/30/us/stephon-clark-independent-autopsy.html
[https://perma.cc/LBP6-9GR2].
282. For national coverage see, for example, Josiah Bates, The Death of Stephon Clark:
What We Know About the Sacramento Police Shooting, ABC NEWS (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/death-stephon-clark-police-shooting/story?id=54039443
[https://perma.cc/TA97-JUBZ]; Christine Hauser, Sacramento Man Fatally Shot by the Police
in His Backyard, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/21/us/stephon-clark-police-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/6T6M-PPUP]; Richard
Winton, Sarah Parvini & Monte Morin, Stephon Clark Shooting: How Police Opened Fire on
an Unarmed Black Man Holding a Cellphone, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-stephon-clark-shooting-sacramento-explainer20180323-story.html [https://perma.cc/74LG-HN3K]. For coverage of the California Attorney
General’s investigation of the shooting, see Brandon E. Patterson, California AG Launches
Investigation into Stephon Clark Shooting, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2018/03/california-ag-launches-investigationof-stephon-clark-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/MNT5-CRXN] (describing the state attorney
general’s investigation). Ultimately, the California Attorney General declined to bring
criminal charges against the officers who killed Stephon Clark. See Jose A. Del Real & Matt
Stevens, Stephon Clark Shooting: California’s Attorney General Won’t Charge Officers, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/05/us/sacramento-stephon-clarkprotests.html [https://perma.cc/Q5GG-6DFA].
283. Assemb. 931, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess, § 2 (Cal. 2017) (“A peace officer may use
deadly force only when such force is necessary to defend against a threat of imminent death
or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person.”) (emphasis added).
284. See supra Part I.C.1 (describing these organizations’ recommendations).
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power to use force had been implemented in San Francisco and Seattle.285 And
decades of research on the effects of restrictive use-of-force policies in Atlanta,
Kansas City, New York, Oakland, and Philadelphia supports the conclusion that
these types of policies can save lives.286 Nevertheless, Lexipol vigorously opposed
AB 931.
Lexipol characterized AB 931 as a “knee-jerk reaction to Stephon Clark,” which
it said was “one of many controversial shootings that the activists were promoting to
restrict law enforcement use of force.”287 Bruce Praet called the bill “ill-conceived
and dangerous” and called on “law enforcement, from chief executives down to line
officers” to “actively campaign for its defeat.”288 Praet warned that the effort by state
legislators would “craft[] unrealistic legal standards that will only serve to further
inhibit law enforcement’s ability to deal with increasingly violent criminals.”289 Praet
also attacked lawmakers who supported the legislation as antipolice: “Just once it
would be great to ask the people behind such efforts whether they’re willing to run
into an active-shooter situation, or who they’ll be calling when they hear their
downstairs window break at two o’clock in the morning.”290
Michael Ranalli, Program Manager for Lexipol, echoed these same sentiments,
criticizing the introduction of California’s AB 931 as a “rush to judgment” typical of
what often happens after “a police use of deadly force incident.”291 Ranalli urged that
“dismay and anger” caused by these incidents are “borne out of a limited
understanding of the law” and are “hardly the basis for changing the established
standards governing police use of force.”292
Lexipol took to Twitter (Figure 6) to warn that AB 931 was “bad for law
enforcement, the legal system and the community.”293 The company’s opposition
was centered on the bill’s deviation from Graham. According to Lexipol, adopting a
“necessary” standard for the use of deadly force would unsettle legal precedent
holding that officers using force “need not select the least intrusive or even most
reasonable action.”294 Therefore, according to Lexipol, AB 931 would result in “large
verdicts against law enforcement officers and their agencies.”295 Ultimately, the bill
did not pass.

285. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text (describing use-of-force policy reforms
in Seattle and San Francisco).
286. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text (describing this research).
287. Lexipol Webinar on AB 392, supra note 164, at 4:46–5:07.
288. Bruce Praet, Police Use of Force Legislation: The (Un)Intended Consequences of CA
AB 931, LEXIPOL (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/police-use-forcelegislation-unintended-consequences-ab931/ [https://perma.cc/CNZ5-HFJL] [hereinafter
Praet, (Un)Intended Consequences].
289. Id.
290. Bruce Praet, Exactly Who Creates the Need for Deadly Force?, LEXIPOL (May 17,
2018), https://www.lexipol.com/exactly-who-creates-the-need-for-deadly-force/ [https://
perma.cc/L4Y2-EUF5] (emphasis omitted).
291. Ranalli on Countering the Critics, supra note 202.
292. Id.
293. @Lexipol, TWITTER (Apr. 23, 2018, 9:13 PM), https://twitter.com/Lexipol/
status/988601776260747265 [https://perma.cc/5TNG-YC3R].
294. Praet, (Un)Intended Consequences, supra note 288.
295. Id.
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Figure 6. Lexipol Tweet

In 2019, California lawmakers proposed and passed a successor bill, AB 392,
known as the Act to Save Lives or the Stephon Clark Law.296 Under the new law,
which went into effect on January 1, 2020, law enforcement officers in California
may use deadly force only when “necessary.” The new law also clarifies that officers’
conduct leading up to the use of force is relevant in determining its necessity and
requires that prior to using deadly force, “officers shall . . . use other available
resources and techniques if reasonably safe and feasible to an objectively reasonable
officer.”297
AB 392’s final text was the product of compromise, and some of the language
was weakened in response to opposition from law enforcement groups. For example,
although the bill restricts deadly force only to circumstances when it is “necessary,”
a definition of “necessary” was removed from the bill, and the necessity of using
force was made dependent upon the “totality of the circumstances,” defined as “all
facts known to the peace officer at the time, including the conduct of the officer and
the subject leading up to the use of deadly force.”298 Language was also removed
from the statute that would have required officers to use de-escalation tools.299 Some
groups, including Black Lives Matter, withdrew their support for the legislation as a

296. Assemb. 392, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
297. CAL. PENAL CODE § 835a(a)(2) (2020).
298. Id. § 835a(e)(3).
299. Jane Coaston, California’s New Law to Stop Police Shootings, Explained, VOX (Aug.
23, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/8/23/20826646/california-act-to-save-livesab-392-explained [https://perma.cc/VA3L-GYSA].
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result of these modifications.300 However, despite uncertainty about what the
“necessary” standard will mean in practice, and the inclusion of a consideration of
the “totality of the circumstances,” many still view the bill as an important step
forward to limit police power to use force.301
As soon as AB 392 was introduced, Lexipol sought to undermine the bill. In April
2019, as hearings on the bill began, Bruce Praet complained that the requirement that
officers’ preshooting conduct be considered when determining whether force
violated the law would introduce uncertainty into prosecutors’ determinations:
It’s going to take years and cost millions to define what is negligent
tactics, and more specifically what are criminally negligent tactics. . . .
In the meantime, who becomes the guinea pig? Which officers get
sacrificed to test the new law? Which D.A. is going to be motivated by
the pressures of protestors outside his offices?302
After AB 392 was passed, Lexipol took credit for the controversial amendments
to the bill. We do not know for certain what role Lexipol LLC played in pushing
forward the elimination of a definition of “necessary” or the inclusion of a
consideration of the “totality of the circumstances.” But, in a “Client Alert” to the
company’s California subscribers from Praet’s law firm, Lexipol suggested that it
did play an active role in these efforts by framing modifications to the original bill’s
language as changes that “we were able to convince the Legislature to add.”303
This “Client Alert” also made clear Lexipol’s view that the amendments to AB
392 meant that Graham v. Connor remained the standard for excessive force, despite
the inclusion of the word “necessary” in the statute. As Praet explained to California
subscribers, “[n]otwithstanding a few benign changes . . . the good news is that we’ve
managed to fully retain the ‘reasonableness’ standard so artfully established by the
U.S. Supreme Court back in 1989 in Graham v. Connor.”304 Furthermore, Praet
clearly stated to Lexipol subscribers that AB 392 “will have little, if any, negative
effect on how officers perform their daily jobs.”305

300. Id.
301. See id. (describing the ACLU’s view that AB392 is “extraordinary, precedent-setting”
legislation). The California State Legislature clearly views the bill as making a difference,
describing it as changing the standard for the use of deadly force so that it will be used “only
when necessary in defense of human life.” Id.; see also infra notes 313–15 and accompanying
text (describing the view of California POST that the statute limits officers’ power to use
force).
302. Anita Chabria, Why California’s Proposed Law on Deadly Police Force Isn’t as
Tough as It Seems, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-mecalifornia-use-of-force-police-shootings-stephon-clark-20190404-story.html
[https://perma.cc/G4ZS-SD3V].
303. See, e.g., Client Alert from Bruce D. Praet, AB 392 Use of Force Legislation [Penal
Code §835a] (Aug. 6, 2019), https://porac.org/wp-content/uploads/Lexipol-UPDATE-2019re-AB392.pdf [https://perma.cc/984V-7Q9D].
304. Id.
305. Id.
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After the bill was signed, Lexipol produced a webinar in which Bruce Praet again
minimized the significance of the new law.306 In the webinar, Praet began by
characterizing the Act to Save Lives as “pretty much a knee-jerk reaction by some
of the more liberal legislators to try to put handcuffs on law enforcement on the
ability to use force.”307 However, he reassured listeners that the standard for use of
force was not changed by the new law: “What is the new standard? The new standard
is the exact same thing we’ve had for the last fifty years, and that is Graham v.
Connor, [the] objective reasonableness standard.”308 Praet also described the law as
requiring officers to “consider other resources and techniques” before using force,
but emphasized that that requirement only goes into effect when an officer concludes
those alternatives are “reasonable and feasible.”309 An accompanying PowerPoint
slide displayed for webinar participants (Figure 7) summed up Lexipol’s view of the
new California law this way: “Is LE now limited to use of force only when
‘necessary’? NO!”310
Figure 7: Lexipol Webinar on California’s AB 392

The claim by Lexipol that the new California standard is “the exact same thing
we’ve had for the last fifty years” conflicts with the stated intent of the California
legislature “that peace officers use deadly force only when necessary in defense of
human life.”311 The repeated claims by Lexipol that the Graham standard still applies

306. Lexipol Webinar on AB 392, supra note 164, at 25:28.
307. Id. at 3:27.
308. Id. at 4:21.
309. Id. at 11:03.
310. Id.
311. CAL. PENAL CODE § 835a(a)(2) (2020) (“[I]t is the intent of the Legislature that peace
officers use deadly force only when necessary in defense of human life.” (emphasis added)).
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to the use of deadly force in California goes against the legislative intent to establish
a new standard more restrictive than Graham v. Connor.312
Lexipol’s advice to its subscribers also contradicts the view of district attorneys
who will be deciding whether officers have violated the new law. California’s State
Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Trainings (POST) created a video to
describe the new use-of-force standard in AB 392 from the perspective of district
attorneys.313 Michael Hestrin, the District Attorney for Riverside County, who is
extensively interviewed in the video, describes the new law as containing
“meaningful changes” that “codify an emphasis that’s been happening in law
enforcement towards de-escalation and the use of less lethal force.”314 This district
attorney also explains that, when he assesses whether an officer has violated the new
law, “I’m going to use the necessary standard, and I’m going to ask . . . was the use
of force necessary in this situation given everything the officer knew.”315 Lexipol’s
assertion that AB 392 does not change the use-of-force standard thus contradicts the
view of a district attorney who will decide whether thousands of officers—including
officers in jurisdictions that subscribe to Lexipol—have violated the law.
Lexipol made repeated efforts to undermine AB 931 and then AB 392 and
characterized AB 392, after it passed, as making no meaningful change to use-offorce standards, in contravention to the legislative intent of the bill and the view of
advocates and government officials. But, its efforts have not ended there. California
POST is mandated by a companion bill, SB 230, to create training and other
guidelines regarding use-of-force standards. As a POST representative explained to
one of us, it always develops its curriculum and guidelines with input from “subject
matter experts from the field, legal and of the public.”316 This representative also
disclosed that Bruce Praet “has been one of those experts used in development of SB
230 requirements.”317 She made clear that Praet was being consulted because of his
legal expertise, not his role at Lexipol, and that California POST “does not endorse
individual companies.”318 However, Bruce Praet’s communications and Lexipol’s
official communications make clear that there is little daylight separating the two.
And Lexipol’s position on AB 392 suggests that Praet may use his role as a POST

312. SENATE RULES COMM., SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS, Assemb. 392, 2019 Leg., Reg.
Sess., at 6 (Cal. 2019), https://trackbill.com/bill/california-assembly-bill-392-peace-officersdeadly-force/1678109/ [https://perma.cc/QH58-XU3Q] (“Unlike existing California statutory
law, the provisions of this bill would exceed the standards articulated and set forth by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Graham.”).
313. AB 392 and Peace Officer Use of Force Standards, COMM’N ON POLICE OFFICER
STANDARDS
&
TRAINING,
https://post.ca.gov/Use-of-Force-Standards#UseOfForce
[https://perma.cc/67GM-DX77].
314. AB 392: Use of Force Standards, COMM’N ON POLICE OFFICER STANDARDS &
TRAINING, 0:59, 2:06, https://postsms-usw22.streaming.media.azure.net/1397578a-85194d61-8e6499cef48c421e/use_of_force_full_11_1_19_rev1_1280x720_AACAudio_2480.mp4.
315. Id. at 12:28.
316. Email from Meagan Catafi, Legis. Liaison/Pub. Info. Officer, Comm’n on Peace
Officer Standards & Training (POST), to Joanna Schwartz (July 22, 2020, 2:39 PM) (on file
with authors).
317. Id.
318. Id.
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advisor to further limit the practical impact of the new standard on police trainings
and other guidelines.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Having described the push for use-of-force policy reform and Lexipol’s multipronged efforts against these reforms, this Part considers the implications of our
findings. First, we review the ways in which Lexipol has frustrated—and likely will
continue to frustrate—efforts at reform. Next, we direct recommendations to local
governments that we contend should be increasingly cautious about developing or
continuing a relationship with Lexipol LLC. Finally, we argue that those pushing for
change to use-of-force policies must be informed about Lexipol’s influential
retrograde policies and anti-reform stance.
A. How Lexipol’s Efforts Frustrate Reform
This Article makes clear that Lexipol is likely to impair the prospect of use-offorce policy reforms in three ways. First, Lexipol’s resistance to more restrictive
policies will limit the reach of reform efforts nationwide. Subscribers rely on Lexipol
to provide them with ready-made policies and officer trainings. These 3500
participating agencies—amounting to almost one-fifth of law enforcement agencies
across the country—are likely to simply adopt the use-of-force policies provided in
Lexipol’s off-the-shelf manual.319 Lexipol agencies also rely on the company for
general education on use-of-force standards, webinars on current issues involving
police shootings, and related police training. Yet, as we show in this Article, those
materials and trainings emphasize officer discretion and adopt a warrior-type stance
to policing. As a result, if Lexipol continues to refuse to embrace proposed reforms
to use-of-force policies in its police manuals, its subscribers likely will too.
Second, Lexipol’s megaphone in the policing debate means that it has an outsized
influence on how police departments and local governments respond to demands for
change. As we unearth in this Article, despite attempting to present itself as a neutral
provider of “legally defensible” policies, Lexipol is not at all neutral when it comes
to use-of-force policy. Rather, the company and its representatives have been vocal
in defending policies that give officers maximum discretion. And, they don’t just
stop there. Lexipol uses its web platform,320 blogs, and media arms, like Police1, to
vigorously advocate against reform, including against use-of-force continuums,
bright-line rules, and anything that would go beyond the Graham standard.

319. As we described in our previous study, Lexipol does not give its subscribers complete
information about alternatives to its policy and training choices in contested areas and makes
it difficult for subscribers to modify Lexipol’s standard policies. Eagly & Schwartz, supra note
10, at 930–37.
320. As Lexipol writes on its webpage, it has been “encouraged” by the wide reach of its
web presence “to use webinars as a platform to dive deeper into police reform topics. Lexipol
also launched a website last year dedicated to providing information to law enforcement and
community members on police use of force policy.” Lexipol Announces Free Police Reform
Webinar Series, LEXIPOL (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/lexipolannounces-free-police-reform-webinar-series/ [https://perma.cc/KX3S-5CTY].
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Third, Lexipol threatens to undermine reforms once they are adopted by federal,
state, and local governments. Even if Congress, states, or local governments mandate
changes to use-of-force policies, those mandates are just the first step. The next is
actually implementing these changes in the nearly 18,000 law enforcement agencies
across the country. Here, Lexipol also plays a key role. In fact, in past instances
where police departments have been investigated by the Department of Justice for
use-of-force and other constitutional violations, Lexipol has been hired to write
policies to implement the required reforms.321 Lexipol is being called upon again
today to help implement reforms that respond to calls for change. One example of
Lexipol’s continuing efforts in this space is Bruce Praet’s role as an expert consultant
to California’s POST as they create policies and trainings to conform with AB 392.322
Other states are currently reviewing their use-of-force standards, and Lexipol may
well be retained to interpret new laws and draft implementing policies.323
Lexipol may also take advantage of this moment of reform to expand their
dominance in the policy field. For example, former New York Governor Cuomo
signed an executive order in June 2020 requiring the state’s more than 500 law
enforcement agencies “to develop a plan that reinvents and modernizes police
strategies and programs in their community based on community input” by April
2021, or risk losing state funding.324 This requirement has, reportedly, left small New
York jurisdictions “scrambling and overwhelmed at the prospect of having to rewrite
their police rulebooks from scratch.”325 Seeing this new requirement as a business
opportunity, Lexipol has offered to assist New York agencies to comply with the
executive order. Agencies appear to be taking them up on this offer. For example,
the village of Saranac Lake agreed to pay Lexipol $11,000, plus additional yearly
fees, to write its police policies.326 But, as the California example from AB 392
teaches, Lexipol’s involvement in these processes threatens to dilute the intended
impact of New York’s attempt to “reinvent and modernize” policing.
Lexipol may also be able to capitalize on federal reforms. Following weeks of
sustained protest in support of Black Lives Matter, former President Donald Trump
signed an executive order calling for “[i]ndependent credentialing bodies” to review

321. For example, police departments in both Baltimore and New Orleans turned to
Lexipol to craft their policies as part of a consent decree. See Justin Fenton & Doug Donovan,
Use of Local Foundation Allowed Baltimore Police Surveillance Project to Remain Secret,
BALT. SUN (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bsmd-ci-community-foundation-20160824-story.html [https://perma.cc/EY7J-YJZA]; Charles
Maldonado, Paying for the Consent Decree, GAMBIT (Aug. 14, 2012), https://perma.cc/5VYTV62X.
322. See supra notes 317–18 and accompanying text.
323. As just one example, Maryland passed a sweeping reform bill that limits police use
of force to what is “necessary and proportional.” Michael Levenson & Bryan Pietsch,
Maryland Passes Sweeping Police Reform Legislation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/10/us/maryland-police-reform.html
[https://perma.cc/UNN5-6HFC].
324. Alice Speri, Private Company Moves to Profit from New York’s Police Reforms,
INTERCEPT (Aug. 9, 2020), https://theintercept.com/2020/08/09/new-york-police-reformlexipol/ [https://perma.cc/YQ78-4WGR].
325. Id.
326. See id.
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law enforcement policies and trainings.327 The executive order, which uses
discretionary grant funding as a carrot to encourage agencies to voluntarily
participate in the program, gives wide-ranging discretion to police policy experts on
how to write policies and construct trainings.328 Experience tells us that if agencies
contract with Lexipol to review their policies, any change will be designed to protect
officers’ interests, not Black lives.
B. How Lexipol’s Efforts Harm Government Interests
We have previously argued that local governments should be cautious about
contracting with Lexipol. Their policies are overly focused on limiting officer
liability; they do not provide subscribing agencies with enough information about
their policies and the experts who craft them to make educated decisions about
whether to adopt the policies; and Lexipol’s ready-made policies make it difficult for
the kind of community engagement that experts believe is necessary for democratic
rulemaking.329 In this Article, we offer additional reasons for local governments to
exercise caution before contracting with Lexipol: its aggressive stance against reform
may harm government interests, exposing local governments and officers to more
liability instead of less.
For example, New York’s executive order “calls on community members,
stakeholders, local elected officials and police to come to the table and be part of a
collective effort to create transparent and fair law enforcement policies that reflect
the community’s desires.”330 The executive order requires that municipalities “file a
certification with the state Division of Budget and certify that all stakeholders
contributed to the process” before securing entitlement to state funding.331 However,
all available evidence suggests that Lexipol’s efforts to capitalize on this executive
order in New York go against the language and spirit of the order. In July of 2020,
Lexipol held a webinar with the New York State Association of Chiefs of Police that
told potential subscribers how to limit liability and maximize officer flexibility in the
face of new state limits on use of force.332 Some local governments in New York are
contracting with Lexipol while resisting community input about the decision to do
so.333 And if past is precedent, once in contract with Lexipol, these local governments
will adopt their proposed policies with minimal public engagement. Although lack
of community engagement with police policies is always troubling, this approach
now appears to violate New York law.

327. See Exec. Order No. 13,929, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,325, § 2(c) (June 19, 2020) (creating a
credentialing program to encourage meeting standards set by the Attorney General).
328. See id. § 2(b).
329. Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 896–97.
330. Speri, supra note 324.
331. Id.
332. New York Legislative Update: Understanding Recent Police Reform Legislation,
LEXIPOL (July 30, 2020), https://info.lexipol.com/webinar-new-york-legislative-update
[https://perma.cc/Y3YE-T9C2] (complete “Register Now” instructions then follow “View
Now” hyperlink).
333. Speri, supra note 324.
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Lexipol’s efforts to minimize the effects of AB 392 on California agencies may
also expose its subscribers to liability. Lexipol’s staunch position that AB 392 “does
not create a new legal standard for the use of deadly force” is inconsistent with the
view of the California State Legislature that passed the bill, district attorneys, and
advocacy groups including the ACLU.334 Lexipol’s opinion on the effects of AB 392
is not, however, limited to its blog posts and webinars—it also guides the use-offorce policies it provides to the hundreds of California law enforcement agencies that
count themselves as Lexipol subscribers.335
Lexipol’s assertion that California’s use-of-force standard has not changed could
also expose officers to criminal liability. The District Attorney from Riverside
County, who spoke in the California POST training video on AB 392, explained that
he will evaluate whether officers’ use of force was necessary when deciding whether
to criminally prosecute an officer.336 However, officers in Riverside County that
subscribe to Lexipol, including police departments in Riverside, Corona, Palm
Springs, Cathedral City, and Beaumont, are getting the message from Lexipol that
their decisions to use force need only comply with the Graham standard.337
Lexipol’s stance on AB 392 may also expose cities to civil liability. The ACLU
of Southern California recently filed a taxpayer action against the City of Pomona
for adopting policies—crafted by Lexipol—that do not conform to current law.338
The ACLU’s complaint alleges that Pomona police officers killed three people since
the enactment of AB 392 and that, during this time, Pomona spent public funds on
Lexipol trainings and policies that violate AB 392. The lawsuit also cites the Lexipol

334. Id.
335. Lexipol’s California clients appear to have adopted Lexipol’s changes to use-of-force
policies in light of AB 392. See, e.g., LEXIPOL, Policy 300—Use of Force, in SANTA ROSA
POLICE
DEPARTMENT
POLICY
MANUAL
(June
16,
2020),
https://srcity.org/DocumentCenter/View/30463/__Policy_Manual2020OctNEW?bidId=
[https://perma.cc/T2NC-FLNJ]; LEXIPOL, Policy 300—Use of Force, in ANAHEIM POLICE
DEPARTMENT POLICY MANUAL (Aug.
27,
2020),
https://www.anaheim.net/
DocumentCenter/View/29459/APD-Policy-Manual
[https://perma.cc/TWX5-AYZK];
LEXIPOL, Policy 300—Use of Force, in SALINAS POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY MANUAL (Dec.
1, 2020), https://perma.cc/BE6R-N9GK; LEXIPOL, Policy 300—Use of Force, in HUMBOLDT
COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE MANUAL (June 14, 2021), https://humboldtgov.org/
DocumentCenter/View/86838/HCSO-Policy-Manual
[https://perma.cc/45PW-AMQM].
These policies reflect some differences in use-of-force policy language; it is impossible to
know from these manuals what, precisely, Lexipol’s California use-of-force policy provides
and what modifications these subscribers have made. One of the authors requested that Lexipol
produce a copy of their California use-of-force policy, reflecting changes made in light of AB
392; they declined to do so. See Email from Tim Kensok, Vice President, Prod, Mgmt.,
Lexipol LLC, to Joanna Schwartz (Oct. 2, 2020, 1:35 PM) (explaining that he “can’t directly
provide our CA State Master”) (on file with authors).
336. See supra notes 314–15 and accompanying text.
337. See Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 10, at appendix (setting out the cities in Riverside
County that subscribe to Lexipol).
338. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Gente Organizada v. Pomona
Police Dep’t, No. 20-ST-CV-28895 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. July 31, 2020),
https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/aclu_socal_pomona_20200731_complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7AJ-9MYT].
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webinar instructing its subscribers and their officers that the new California law “is
the exact same thing we’ve had for the last fifty years.”339 The suit seeks to enjoin
Pomona from using funds to educate and train its officers about an unlawful standard
and requests an injunction barring Lexipol materials that misstate the law.340
Lexipol markets its services as designed to reduce liability. It contends that its
policies are crafted to conform with federal and state laws and best practices. In
contrast, this Article has shown that Lexipol is not playing the neutral role that it
suggests. In taking aggressive positions against the types of reforms that are being
adopted in California, New York, and elsewhere, Lexipol threatens to expose local
governments to the very type of civil liability they seek to avoid and may even expose
officers to criminal liability. Of course, local governments must adopt policies that
conform with newly enacted reforms. But delegating those responsibilities to Lexipol
may solve local governments’ problems in the short term, while creating additional
problems for them in the longer term.
C. How Lexipol Should Shape Advocacy Efforts
This Article has revealed that Lexipol is playing an underappreciated, yet central,
role in policing policy. Far from being a neutral scribe of policing policies, Lexipol
advocates a set of positions about use-of-force policies and actively opposes policing
reforms that would restrict officer discretion. Our research suggests that advocates
pressing for local governments to adopt policy reforms should keep in mind that the
success of their efforts may depend on who is writing their jurisdiction’s policies. It
is becoming increasingly likely that Lexipol is crafting those policies. And, so long
as they are, advocates will be fighting not just the decisions by local police officials
but also the decisions by a private, for-profit company engaged in a multipronged
effort to prevent these types of policies from being enacted.
We encourage nonprofit organizations and other groups with knowledge about
policing to draft easily adoptable policies to disseminate to local policing agencies.
These policies could prioritize police accountability instead of discretion and be
based on research rather than concerns about police liability. Given that so many
agencies do subscribe to Lexipol, experts could produce these use-of-force policies
in a way that could be easily adopted into the Lexipol template. Although some
organizations have begun this work, more state-specific policies need to be crafted
and made readily available to policing agencies.
There are other steps that concerned community members and advocacy groups
could take to change this state of affairs. One approach is to bring taxpayer suits—
like the ACLU’s suit against Pomona—challenging the use of taxpayer money to buy
Lexipol’s questionable services. Another possibility is for groups to oppose
Lexipol’s efforts to enter into contracts with new jurisdictions. A final option is to
push local governments to demand that Lexipol amend its policies to reflect
evidence-based alternatives that limit officer discretion. Lexipol has not yet been

339. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Sues Pomona Over Refusal to Implement New Police
Law (July 31, 2020), https://www.aclusocal.org/en/press-releases/aclu-sues-pomona-overrefusal-implement-new-police-law [https://perma.cc/526X-LXY6]; see also Lexipol Webinar
on AB 392, supra note 164, at 4:21.
340. ACLU, supra note 339.
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swayed by public calls to reform. However, given its focus on the bottom line, it
might well pay additional attention if local government subscribers threaten not to
renew their contracts until Lexipol’s policies and trainings are improved.
Lexipol provides an attractive service, particularly for small jurisdictions without
the infrastructure to write and keep current their policies and trainings.341 However,
given the concerns raised in this Article, we encourage jurisdictions not to adopt
Lexipol’s manual off the shelf. Instead, jurisdictions could use Lexipol’s policies as
a starting point to develop their own use-of-force standards that embrace approaches
proven to reduce police violence. In drafting these materials, jurisdictions should
consult with other experts and departments that do not subscribe to Lexipol and invite
community members to voice their concerns about police violence.
CONCLUSION
America is in the midst of a critically important moment in police reform.
National and local attention is fixed on how to reduce the number of people killed
and injured by the police. One approach that has been proven to reduce police killings
is to limit police power to use force. This Article shows that Lexipol is blocking this
path to reform in multiple ways: by promoting policies and trainings that do not adopt
use-of-force policy reforms, by advocating against these reforms, and by limiting
their impact when adopted. Even though local governments and insurers have viewed
Lexipol as an essential partner in keeping policies lawful and up to date, it is time
that they take a closer look. Lexipol’s aggressive efforts to limit and undermine useof-force policy reform may ultimately expose officers and agencies to liability
instead of shielding them from it. Unless and until the company changes its approach,
Lexipol should be viewed as an impediment to reform.

341. See Eagly & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 898–99 (describing this benefit of Lexipol).
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